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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 11:44 pm
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Results for criminal investigations
53 results foundAuthor: National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA, UK) Title: Practice Advice on Investigating Stalking and Harassment Summary: Investigations relating to harassment can be linked to some of the most serious crimes that the police deal with including murder, sexual offences and domestic abuse. Effective police responses to crimes related to harassment can have a direct impact on improving public satisfaction and confidence in the criminal justice system and bringing offenders to justice. This document provides strategic and operational advice for reporting, responding to and investigating harassment. (Excerpts from Document) Details: Wyboston, UK: Association of Chief Police Officers and the National Policing Improvement Agency, 2009. 78p. Source: Interet Resource; Accessed August 14, 2010 at: http://www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/Stalking_and_Harassment.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/Stalking_and_Harassment.pdf Shelf Number: 117751 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsDomestic AbuseHarassmentSex CrimesSex OffendersSexual AssaultSexual ViolenceStalking |
Author: Schollum, Mary Title: Investigative Interviewing: The Literature Summary: This review provides an overview of investigative interviewing within policing. It may also be of interest to anyone who uses this type of interviewing on the job including insurance fraud investigators, lawyers, and government departments. The review outlines the efforts made by police and psychologists in recent decades to: convey the importance of investigative interviewing; understand what happens in an investigative interview; use psychological theories and research to find out what makes a successful interview; examine the effectiveness of various skills and techniques; find a basic framework and rationale to underlie investigative interviews; and produce guidelines on how to conduct interviews. The headings are designed so readers can easily look up topics they are interested in. Not all topics are mutually exclusive. For example, there are separate sections on body language and deception. Yet one of the ways thought to help in detecting whether someone is lying is through interpreting body language. Thus there is overlap between these two topics, and of course many others. Details: Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Police, 2005. 109p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed December 23, 2010 at: http://www.police.govt.nz/resources/2005/investigative-interviewing/investigative-interviewing.pdf Year: 2005 Country: International URL: http://www.police.govt.nz/resources/2005/investigative-interviewing/investigative-interviewing.pdf Shelf Number: 120626 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsInterrogationInterviewing |
Author: LePard, Doug Title: Missing Women: Investigation Review Summary: The report provides a chronology of events and a critical analysis of the investigation into the then unexplained disappearances of numerous sex trade workers, the majority of whom were associated with the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver. We now know that many of the Missing Women fell prey to a serial killer. It should be noted at the outset that while it is clear today who the serial killer was, that is with the benefit of hindsight. Even when a fully functioning multi-jurisdictional team of highly competent and experienced investigators was assembled and had the capacity to review all available information, it still didn’t identify Pickton as a priority suspect and the case broke because of serendipitous circumstances. As well, two other serial murder cases in BC remain unresolved, despite extraordinary investigative efforts; clearly the challenges of a serial killer investigation are immense. The disappearances of the Missing Women began in the mid-1990s and ended when Robert Pickton was arrested in February 2002. The Review examines the general failures occurring in the Vancouver Police Department investigation, and also the specific failures occurring in the Coquitlam RCMP investigation after they received information and evidence in 1998 and 1999 that directly linked Pickton to homicides of sex trade workers. The Review concludes with recommendations that, if implemented, would correct problems and minimize the probability of such problems from occurring again. Some of these deficiencies have been corrected since they were first identified in 2004, but there are others beyond the control of the VPD that have not been satisfactorily addressed. Details: Vancouver, BC: Vancouver Police Department, 2010. 408p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2011 at: http://www.cbc.ca/bc/news/bc-100820-vancouver-police-pickton-investigation-review.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Canada URL: http://www.cbc.ca/bc/news/bc-100820-vancouver-police-pickton-investigation-review.pdf Shelf Number: 120735 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsHomicideProstitutesSerial Crimes |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Child Pornography: Steps Are Needed to Ensure That Tips to Law Enforcement Are Useful and Forensic Examinations Are Cost Effective Summary: The Department of Justice (DOJ) reports that online child pornography crime has increased. DOJ funds the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which maintains the CyberTipline to receive child pornography tips. The Providing Resources, Officers, and Technology To Eradicate Cyber Threats to Our Children Act of 2008 (the Act) contains provisions to facilitate these investigations and create a national strategy to prevent, among other things, child pornography. The Act directed GAO to report on actions to minimize duplication and enhance federal expenditures to address this crime. This report examines (1) the extent to which NCMEC determines the usefulness of tips; (2) mechanisms to help law enforcement coordination (i.e., deconfliction); and (3) the extent to which agencies are addressing factors that federal law enforcement reports may inhibit investigations. GAO analyzed the Act and spoke to law enforcement officials who investigate these crimes, selected to reflect geographic range, among other things. Although these interviews cannot be generalized, they provided insight into investigations. NCMEC takes steps to obtain feedback from law enforcement on the usefulness of CyberTipline reports; however, it does not systematically collect information on how useful individual reports are for initiating and advancing investigations or about information gaps that limit reports' usefulness. For instance, NCMEC solicits feedback via e-mail or in person quarterly from federal law enforcement liaisons at NCMEC about the overall usefulness of CyberTipline reports. However, according to many law enforcement officials GAO contacted, information in a CyberTipline report may not contain an image of apparent child pornography or may contain old data. NCMEC officials said that they are interested in obtaining additional feedback to enhance the usefulness of its reports and could explore additional methods to gather such information, such as creating a systematic process for obtaining feedback from federal law enforcement. Enhancing its processes for collecting feedback on the usefulness of CyberTipline reports could help NCMEC ensure that reports are as useful as possible to law enforcement. Existing deconfliction mechanisms generally prevent pursuit of the same suspects but are fragmented; DOJ is in the early stages of developing a system to address this fragmentation. Many law enforcement officials GAO contacted reported using various nonautomated (e.g., task forces) and automated (e.g., investigative systems) mechanisms to avoid duplication of effort in investigations. But these officials reported that there is not a single automated system that provides comprehensive case information and deconfliction, which can contribute to difficulties coordinating investigations. As mandated in the Act, DOJ is developing a national system to, among other things, provide law enforcement with a single deconfliction tool. Specifically, DOJ is conducting a needs assessment--which it plans to complete in 12 to 24 months--to use as a basis for system development. However, because DOJ is waiting on the results of the needs assessment to begin system development, it may be several years before the system is operational. Backlogs in the forensic analysis of digital evidence can delay or hinder online child pornography investigations; assessing the costs and benefits of taking extra steps to ensure the integrity of forensic analysis could help determine if there are efficiencies that could reduce backlogs. Forensic analysis of digital evidence consists of the review of information from digital media, such as hard drives, and can prove online child pornography crime. Several factors may contribute to backlogs in forensic analysis, including the steps federal law enforcement agencies believe enhance the integrity of analysis, such as making exact copies of digital evidence to discourage tampering. The FBI takes additional steps it believes enhance integrity, such as separating the forensic examination from the investigation. However, some federal officials and prosecutors GAO spoke with differed on the need for such steps. According to DOJ, the national strategy's working group is in a good position to address backlog issues and having this group assess the costs and benefits of steps taken to ensure the integrity of forensic analysis could help it determine potential efficiencies that could reduce backlogs. GAO recommends that NCMEC enhance its processes to collect feedback to improve tips and that DOJ assess the costs and benefits of steps agencies take to ensure the integrity of forensic analysis. NCMEC and DOJ generally concurred with our recommendations and discussed actions to address them. Details: Washington, DC: U.S.Government Accountability Office, 2011. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-334: Accessed April 2, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11334.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11334.pdf Shelf Number: 121221 Keywords: Child AbuseChild PornographyChild ProtectionComputer CrimesCriminal InvestigationsCybercrimesInternetSex Offenses |
Author: Burgoyne, Leigh Alexander Title: The Bioprofiling of Illicit Drugs Summary: It has been found that DNA sequences can be extracted and amplified from typical drug seizures. Non-human DNA in seizures was readily compared for similarities, pair-wise, seizure to seizure and this should be applicable to police intelligence almost immediately and court usage after considerable experience and validation. The technology’s limits are explored and future developments are suggested. Drug seizures usually have less DNA than soils but seizures have a potentially useful human content. Even in the relatively small quantities of drug subjected to testing, the human DNA content was sufficient for conventional forensic “trace DNA” techniques to be quite promising. It is suggested that this human content should be treated as a special case of trace DNA. The limited data currently available suggest that in principle the human profiling described in this paper could be conducted by any forensic laboratory around Australia and across most of the world using familiar equipment and techniques. The profiles generated would be compatible with DNA databases such as National Criminal Investigation DNA Database (NCIDD). An application has been made to NDLERF to validate this approach. Details: Hobart, Tasmania: National Drug Law Enforcement Research Fund, 2008. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Monography Series No. 30: Accessed April 12, 2011 at: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/pub/Monograph_30.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/pub/Monograph_30.pdf Shelf Number: 121317 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsDNA TypingDrug TestingForensicsIllicit Drugs (Australia) |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations Summary: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, the Bureau) is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with counterterrorism investigations. Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the FBI has implemented a series of reforms intended to transform itself from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on investigations of criminal activity into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of terrorism. This report provides background information on key elements of the FBI terrorism investigative process based on publicly available information. It discusses • several enhanced investigative tools, authorities, and capabilities provided to the FBI through post-9/11 legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001; the 2008 revision to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Mukasey Guidelines); and the expansion of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) throughout the country; • intelligence reform within the FBI and concerns about the progress of those reform initiatives; • the FBI’s proactive, intelligence-driven posture in its terrorism investigations using preventative policing techniques such as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of agent provocateurs; and • the implications for privacy and civil liberties inherent in the use of preventative policing techniques to combat terrorism. This report sets forth possible considerations for Congress as it executes its oversight role. These issues include the extent to which intelligence has been integrated into FBI operations to support its counterterrorism mission and the progress the Bureau has made on its intelligence reform initiatives. In addition, these issues will also be relevant during confirmation hearings for a new director. The statutory 10-year term of current FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III expires in September 2011. A new director will be subject to Senate confirmation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS R41780: Accessed May 11, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf Shelf Number: 121706 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsDomestic IntelligenceTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Committee on the Administration of Justice (Northern Ireland) Title: Human Rights and Dealing with Historic Cases - A Review of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Summary: In recent years, a number of concerns have been raised about the capacity of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) to investigate historic cases due to the length of time taken, the quality of the reports it has published, and the conclusions reached. The most recent reports into historic cases published by the Office of the Police Ombudsman have contributed towards a questioning of the Office’s ability and commitment to undertake robust and impartial analysis. A growing lack of confidence in the Office is further exacerbated by the experiences and perceptions of some of those who have referred complaints to OPONI, in particular, those families involved in historic cases due to the death of a loved one. Under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, where complaints against the police relate to violations of the right to life, the UK government is obliged to conduct independent, effective, prompt, and transparent investigations. The UK government has argued during examinations before the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (the body empowered to monitor compliance with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights) that OPONI fulfils its obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This report therefore reviews the Office of the Police Ombudsman on how well it discharges its duties in accordance with the requirements of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights: effectiveness, efficiency (promptness), transparency and independence. Details: Belfast: Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2011. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2011 at: http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2011/06/16/OPONI_report_final1.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2011/06/16/OPONI_report_final1.pdf Shelf Number: 122024 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsOmbudsman (Northern Ireland)Police InvestigationsPolice Oversight |
Author: Metropolitan Police Authority. Civil Liberties Panel Title: Protecting the Innocent: The London Experience of DNA and the National DNA Database Summary: The MPA Civil Liberties Panel, which reports to the MPA Full Authority, was set up as a part of Met Forward, the MPA’s strategic plan. It was established as a means of improving public confidence in policing and ensuring the MPS maintains public trust. The use of DNA in policing is arguably one of the biggest advances in crime investigation since fingerprinting was first used in the early 20th Century. DNA is also highly emotive; it is personal and unique to an individual and when taken allows a significant amount of information to be known about a person. This means the public need to be confident that the police and the government use DNA and DNA records in a way that respects their fundamental right to privacy and protects their civil liberties. With this in mind, the panel have chosen to focus only on DNA that is taken from an individual by the police, for the purposes of investigating crime, including the operation of the DNA Database. Therefore, this review is not concerned with DNA that is obtained from crime scenes (for example, traces of DNA have been found on cigarette butts which have helped secure a conviction for murder). The panel does not dispute the need to take and retain DNA taken from a crime scene in order to assist with the investigation and identification of suspects, nor does it have concerns about the manner in which this is done and processed. The Panel prioritised ‘DNA’ because of the following: • The UK has a higher percentage (8.4%) of its population on a DNA database compared to anywhere else in the world. On 31st July 2010, the estimated total number of individuals retained on the DNA Database was 5.1 million. • The DNA Database contains the DNA profiles of all those convicted for a recordable offence since 1996. However, a change in legislation in 2001 allowed for the retention of DNA on arrest. The DNA Database currently holds all DNA profiles indefinitely, irrespective of whether they have been convicted of committing an offence. Approximately 1 million people or 1 in 5 of those on the DNA database have not been convicted of any offence. • 16% of DNA profiles on the DNA Database are from non-white ethnic groups. The 2001 census identified that 7.9% of the UK population comprised of non white ethnic groups4. Ethnicity monitoring in relation to the DNA Database is based on police ethnic appearance codes (please see Glossary for details) which require the police officer to make their own judgement of an individual’s ethnic appearance on the basis of 6 categories. This differs to the self defined ethnicity codes (please see Glossary for details) used throughout the criminal justice system. A total of 118,990 DNA samples were taken by the Metropolitan Police during 2009/10. There are no records held centrally regarding the total number of DNA samples taken by UK police forces in 2009/10. Of the DNA samples taken by the MPS in 2009/10: • 50% of these samples were taken from white people (71% of London’s population is white6); 49% were taken from black and Asian ethnic groups7 (23% of London’s population comprises of black and Asian ethnic groups). The largest age group represented was 25-44yrs old (45%). Nearly 20% of samples were taken from young people aged 10-17. Public concerns have been raised about the disproportionate representation of some groups and communities on the DNA Database. In December 2008 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in the case of S & Marper v The United Kingdom that indefinite retention of DNA profiles and samples on the National DNA Database was in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to respect for private and family life. The government has recently introduced the Protection of Freedoms Bill which sets out to balance civil liberties and the protection of the public, and in doing so address the issues outlined above. A recent decision by the Supreme Court echoes the ECHR decision in the case of S & Marper. Her Majesty’s Inspectorates for both the Police and the Prison Service are also conducting joint inspections of police custody facilities as part of a six year programme commencing in 2008. Some of the inspections undertaken across England and Wales, including a number of MPS boroughs in London have exposed deficiencies in relation to the management and storage of DNA within custody, including DNA samples not being correctly processed and labelled and on one occasion, DNA samples being stored alongside foodstuffs. The overarching purpose of this review is to ensure that DNA is managed and handled appropriately by the MPS with the necessary safeguards in place in order to strengthen public confidence. Our review has focused on the experience of Londoners, including many who have had their DNA taken by police. Our report provides an illustration of what happens to DNA when it is taken by police from an individual, through to its inclusion on the National DNA Database. As part of our review we examined this whole process in detail, focusing on the impact on individuals and on specific groups, on their perceptions, fears and concerns. Details: London: MPA, 2011. 99p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2011 at: http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/committees/mpa/110630-04-appendix01.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/committees/mpa/110630-04-appendix01.pdf Shelf Number: 122726 Keywords: Civil LibertiesCriminal InvestigationsDNA TypingPolicing (U.K.)Public Opinion |
Author: Schwartz, Martin D. Title: National Institute of Justice Visiting Fellowship: Police Investigation of Rape-Roadblocks and Solutions Summary: This project began as a qualitative investigation into the views of sexual assault detectives. However, in consultation with NIJ Managers, the decision was made to add a quantitative component. Since these two parts are related, but are comprised of vastly different data gathering and analysis schemes, so too this report will be similarly split. The first part of this report covers what was designed to be an exploratory study to explore the attitudes and experiences of active and experienced police rape investigators. The second half of the study, a pencil and paper study of active duty patrol officers (as opposed to investigators), will be reported in the second section of this report. An important supposition behind this study has been that despite an enormous literature on police investigation of sexual assault, very little of this prior study involved speaking to police officers themselves. In particular, part one of the study was designed to ask police detectives what they perceived as their frustrations, roadblocks, or obstacles to successfully completing a rape investigation, and then as a follow-up to ask these same officers what they have been able to successfully do in order to bypass these roadblocks or obstacles. In these qualitative interviews a variety of subtopics was drawn from the literature to be investigated. In some cases these subtopics were ones commonly represented in the literature as problems often faced by police. In other cases, informants, women’s groups, and the various published stories of rape survivors suggested other topics that traditionally have not been discussed extensively in the police literature. Finally, some attempt was made to discuss frustrations or roadblocks that officers might have within their own organizations, with other organizations (e.g., the district attorney’s office) that might hinder successful prosecution of cases, from their point of view. In the report below, the basic literature that led to the various questions and topics will be reviewed. After this, the literature in each of the subtopics will be introduced, and the findings of this study will be explained in that area. The most important findings will appear toward the end, in dealing with false reports. Finally, a first attempt at recommendations that come out of this study will be made. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2010. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232667.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232667.pdf Shelf Number: 122908 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsPolice AttitudesRapeSexual AssaultVictims of Sexual Assault |
Author: Peterson, Joseph Title: The Role and Impact of Forensic Evidence in the Criminal Justice Process Summary: Over the past twenty-five years, the forensic sciences have made dramatic scientific breakthroughs (DNA typing, physical evidence databases, and new scientific instrumentation) but studies are needed to assess the contribution of such advancements on the role and impact of scientific evidence in criminal case processing. Targeted studies have evaluated the value of DNA evidence in property crime investigations, but no studies have reviewed the full array of scientific evidence present at crime scenes. In 2006, the National Institute of Justice funded this project to address the following four goals: Objective 1 — Estimate the percentage of crime scenes from which one or more types of forensic evidence is collected; Objective 2 — Describe and catalog the kinds of forensic evidence collected at crime scenes; Objective 3 — Track the use and attrition of forensic evidence in the criminal justice system from crime scenes through laboratory analysis, and then through subsequent criminal justice processes; and Objective 4 — Identify which forms of forensic evidence contribute most frequently (relative to their availability at a crime scene) to successful case outcomes. Details: Los Angeles: California State University - Los Angeles, School of Criminal Justice & Criminalistics, 2010. 151p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf Shelf Number: 122920 Keywords: Criminal EvidenceCriminal InvestigationsForensic EvidenceForensic Science |
Author: Travers, Harry, ed. Title: Serious Economic Crime: A boardroom guide to prevention and compliance Summary: In many ways this publication, with its contributions from both the public and private sector, and from a wide variety of expert sources, is emblematic of this new approach. Part I features chapters from a number of regulators and key bodies. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) describes the role it plays in prosecuting market abuse and insider dealing, while the chapter by the City of London Police highlights what can be achieved by domestic prosecution agencies working in partnership with equivalent agencies on a global scale. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) expands on the benefits of international co-operation, following closely the pioneering Oslo conference that brought governments, non-governmental organisations and business together in the fight against financial crime, while the World Bank outlines the historic 2010 agreement between multilateral development banks to adopt common definitions of fraud and due process and, crucially, to recognise and enforce debarment decisions of the other signatories. The chapter by Transparency International brings global perspectives on counter-corruption measures, and in a separate chapter the World Bank outlines its anti-corruption agenda. We hear also from the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) on the European Union approach to combating money laundering, while the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics introduces non-regulatory compliance solutions. Details: London: White Page Ltd, 2011. 312p. Source: White Paper: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 27, 2012 at http://www.seriouseconomiccrime.com/ebooks/Serious-Economic-Crime.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.seriouseconomiccrime.com/ebooks/Serious-Economic-Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 123833 Keywords: Business CommunityBusinesses and CrimeCorporate CrimeCriminal InvestigationsEconomic CrimeProsecution |
Author: Kaplow, Louis Title: On the Optimal Burden of Proof Summary: The burden of proof is a central feature of adjudication, and analogues exist in many other settings. It constitutes an important but largely unappreciated policy instrument that interacts with the level of enforcement effort and magnitude of sanctions in controlling harmful activity. Models are examined in which the prospect of sanctions affects not only harmful acts but also benign ones, on account of the prospect of mistaken application of sanctions. Accordingly, determination of the optimal strength of the burden of proof, as well as optimal enforcement effort and sanctions, involves trading off deterrence and the chilling of desirable behavior, the latter being absent in previous work. The character of the optimum differs markedly from prior results and from conventional understandings of proof burdens, which can be understood as involving Bayesian posterior probabilities. Additionally, there are important divergences across models in which enforcement involves monitoring (posting officials to be on the lookout for harmful acts), investigation (inquiry triggered by the costless observation of particular harmful acts), and auditing (scrutiny of a random selection of acts). A number of extensions are analyzed, in one instance nullifying key results in prior work. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper Series; Working Paper 17765: Accessed February 1, 2012 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17765.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17765.pdf Shelf Number: 123921 Keywords: AdjudicationBurden of ProofCriminal Investigations |
Author: Zeh, Jon M. Title: Decentralizing police detectives: Increasing efficiency of property crime investigations Summary: Beginning in November, 2007, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department implemented organizational changes to the Financial / Property Crimes Bureau by decentralizing all property crime detectives. Although no previous research was found on the decentralization of police detectives specifically, there is existing research on similar concepts that suggest at least two benefits of decentralizing police detectives: improved communication with patrol officers and increased efficiency of investigations. With these benefits in mind, the current study examines the following hypotheses: hypothesis 1: decentralizing property crime detectives will lead to improved quality of communication between property crime detectives and patrol officers; hypothesis 2: decentralizing property crime detectives will lead to greater efficiency of property crime investigations. This research will assume a quasi-experimental design with the Southeast Area Command (SEAC) being the experimental group by having detectives decentralized to an area command level and the Southwest Area Command (SWAC) being the comparison group, their detectives remaining at the centralized bureau level. The experimental iii condition began on November 1, 2007 and continued for 8 months, terminating on June 30, 2008 when SWAC was decentralized, ending the department wide reorganization and decentralization of property crimes detectives. Secondary data in the form of a survey that was administered to patrol officers and performance indicators from the area command and detective levels were received from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. These data were used to evaluate the impact that the decentralization had on communication between detectives and officers and the efficiency of property crime investigations. Details: Las Vegas, NV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2009. 54p. Source: UNLV Theses/Dissertations/Professional Papers/Capstones, Paper 1153: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2012 at http://digitalcommons.library.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2155&context=thesesdissertations Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://digitalcommons.library.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2155&context=thesesdissertations Shelf Number: 125041 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsPolice CommunicationPolice InvestigationsProperty Crime |
Author: Victoria. Office of Police Integrity Title: Victoria Police: Recurring Themes in the Management of High Profile Investigations Summary: This report sets out the findings of an OPI review of Victoria Police’s management of investigations, in particular, the management of ‘high profile’ cases – those cases which attract a high level of media attention. A recurring feature of many Victoria Police investigations is the unauthorised release of confidential information or ‘leaking’. Details: Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer, 2012. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 2, 2012 at: Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 125453 Keywords: Confidential InformationCriminal InvestigationsPolice Investigations (Australia)Police Misconduct |
Author: Frank, Richard Title: Social Media Sites: New Fora for Criminal, Communication, and Investigation Opportunities Summary: Over the last two decades, rapid advances in communication technologies have significantly enhanced efficiency and information sharing. The spread of online discussion fora and most recently, social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter, has helped rekindle and maintain connections between friends and acquaintances, facilitated the building of various online communities that share common interests, and created a new space for entrepreneurship and business transactions. Social media tools help to link people with common interests, and facilitate a wide variety of activities in the legitimate sector; it follows that such popular communication and business tools may also facilitate work in the illegitimate sector, perhaps even the work of criminal organizations. The current research complements and builds on existing empirical information regarding the use of social media by criminal organizations and law enforcement by way of literature review and interviews with law enforcement officials and social media experts. All law enforcement respondents and social media experts indicated that law enforcement personnel and organizations have, and continue to, employ social media to connect to the communities that they serve. The goals of law enforcement use of social media as identified by respondents were to connect to and interact with the community, and to proactively monitor the community for disruptive events and activities. Respondents reflected on the challenges they faced when conducting such investigations online. These included the ability to find the correct person among the large number of online social media users, the procedural difficulties associated with acquiring private information from social media data owners, and the time consuming nature of following forensically sound procedures when collecting online evidence, particularly when it is done in such a way as to not leave behind traces of police activities. One recurring recommendation from respondents, which also appears in the literature, is that police officers need more basic training on using computers and the Internet for open source intelligence gathering. Respondents suggest that it is important that law enforcement personnel have access to different computers, websites, and software so that they can be more fluent with them and utilize a variety of tools. Respondents indicated that law enforcement personnel need to accept that police officers will want to use online social media sites for personal reasons. But, they warned that separating police work from personal work is a mandatory requirement. They expressed concern that many police officers do not understand the danger of posting photos and personal information on online social media sites (OSMS), even if they have strict privacy settings. Some respondents suggested that a set of principles be created and followed regarding how police should and can obtain evidence and what they should (not) do to a crime scene where a computer is involved. Respondents suggested that such a guideline would allow law enforcement personnel to be more effective and consistent in gathering evidence from computers. Moreover, such a guideline may help minimize trails left by law enforcement personnel during investigation. Most respondents agreed that persons suspected of organized crime involvement do not tend to display their illicit activities on their social media profiles, but instead use social media to keep connected to their networks. The intersections between the demographic characteristics of persons who use social media and those of persons involved with organized crime may be useful for targeting investigation and communication efforts. This comparison illustrates that, in general, persons involved in organized crime tend to be late-onset offenders, older than those who frequent social media sites, and may perhaps be less likely to use social media. Exceptionally, the two blog sites described in this report, Blogger and Wordpress, were shown to have an older cohort of users. It is possible that members of criminal organizations, like the older general public, may be more attracted to blog sites than to Twitter, FaceBook, or MySpace, and as such may be users or consumers of such social media. Unlike the typical social media user, women involved in criminal organizations tend to be non-Caucasian, with disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds (Beare 2010). As such, it is possible that female organized crime offenders are even less likely than their male counterparts to use social media sites. Details: Ottawa: Research and National Coordination, Organized Crime Division, Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada, 2011. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 7, 2012 at: http://www.sfu.ca/~icrc/content/PS-SP-socialmedia.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Canada URL: http://www.sfu.ca/~icrc/content/PS-SP-socialmedia.pdf Shelf Number: 125499 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsInformation TechnologyMedia and CommunicationsOrganized Crime (Canada)Social Media |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Current Practices in Electronic Surveillance in the Investigation of Serious and Organized Crime Summary: The value of employing electronic surveillance in the investigation of some forms of serious crime, in particular organized crime, is unquestionable. It allows the gathering of information unattainable through other means. Some countries have utilized surreptitious electronic surveillance for nearly a century. For others it is a more recent phenomenon, and for some it is not yet utilized at all. The use by law enforcement of electronic surveillance should not be an investigative tool of first resort, instead its use should be considered when other less intrusive means have proven ineffective or when there is no reasonable alternative to obtain crucial information or evidence. Even when electronic surveillance is appropriate, it will generally need to be used in conjunction with other investigation methods in order to be most effective. For those jurisdictions without any regulation, or with legislation which is lacking in some respect, the challenge is to develop a balanced system for the use of electronic evidence gathering. The balance which needs to be struck is that between the effective use of electronic evidence gathering and the protection of citizens’ rights. This includes balancing the cost of utilizing these methods against the ultimate public benefit gained from a conviction. These considerations should be weighed carefully by legislators, prosecutors, law enforcement and the like. It should also be noted that in some countries the existence of a federal system of governance means that electronic surveillance can be regulated at both a local and at a national level. Federal law will often apply where the investigation is into crime that crosses borders, however, organized crime is of course also investigated by local law enforcement. It is not possible for this document to comprehensively consider regulation of individual states, regions or provinces within countries, although their mention will occur where valuable examples arise. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2009. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 24, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic_surveillance.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic_surveillance.pdf Shelf Number: 125751 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsElectronic SurveillanceOrganized CrimeVideo SurveillanceViolent Crime |
Author: Siska, Tracy Title: Felony Sex Crime Case Processing: Report, Analysis & Recommendations - Chicago/Cook County, Illinois Summary: Criminal justice agencies play a very important role in assisting communities in securing their neighborhoods from crime and violence. The basis for how successful these agencies will be in this role depends greatly on the level of trust built up between each individual agency and community members, and this trust can only be established by empowering community members to become fully engaged partners with the agencies. This partnership relies heavily on the ability of community members to validate the actions of the agencies in order to establish that each agency is operating in the best interests of the public. This is impossible to do when community members are denied access to the data created by the agencies or are ill informed about how the data is collected and what is missing from the data released by the agencies. There is a gap between the system’s stakeholders’ (community members, crime victims, policy makers, advocates for victims, and academics) understanding of what data is collected in the responding to and processing of felony sex crime allegations, and each agency’s data related practices. This gap inhibits the ability of those stakeholders to hold the agencies accountable for poor practices related to felony sex crime allegations. In lieu of data access, the stakeholders are dependent on sporadic and superficial media coverage and press releases from the agencies. The Chicago Justic Project (CJP) seeks to close that gap with this report that specifically examines the data related practices of three agencies in the Chicago/Cook County criminal justice system: the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC), the Chicago Police Department (CPD), and the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (SAO) in order to verify their data capturing, maintaining, and releasing practices related to allegations of felony sex crimes. It is of the utmost importance that communities validate these practices because these agencies help frame the public discussion regarding the prevalence and seriousness of felony sex crimes in our communities. The numbers captured by the agencies become the official record and challenging those figures is nearly impossible because of the restrictions on data. With the current level of restrictions on data it is impossible to judge the impact the practices of one agency is having on other agencies within the local criminal justice system. It is very likely that if, like the advocates assume, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office is rejecting acquaintance rapes at a high level that the Chicago Police Department would bring less of those cases in the future to felony review. To what degree this impact plays in the real world can only be known by examining data from all the agencies involved. Details: Chicago, IL: The Chicago Justice Project, 2011. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2012 at http://www.chicagojustice.org/research/long-form-reports/felony-sex-crime-case-processing-report-analysis-recommendations/CJP_Felony_Sex_Crime_Case_Processing_Report_Analys.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.chicagojustice.org/research/long-form-reports/felony-sex-crime-case-processing-report-analysis-recommendations/CJP_Felony_Sex_Crime_Case_Processing_Report_Analys.pdf Shelf Number: 126526 Keywords: Crime StatisticsCriminal InvestigationsProsecutionsSex Crimes |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Criminal Intelligence: Manual for Front-line Law Enforcement Summary: This manual offers criminal intelligence guidance to law enforcement officers, from understanding relevant concepts and categories, through to specific components of the intelligence process. The Manual specifically address the evaluation of sources and data, analysis and the analytical process, the role of analysis and analytical techniques. This manual offers criminal intelligence guidance to analysts from understanding relevant concepts and categories, through to specific components of the intelligence process. Specially, the manual clarifies evaluation sources of intelligence and data, focusing particularly on basic analytical techniques, including link analysis, event charting, flow analysis and telephone analysis. The manual also equips practitioners to develop inferences and present he results of their analysis. Details: New York: UNODC, 2010. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Criminal_Intelligence_for_Front_Line_Law_Enforcement.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Criminal_Intelligence_for_Front_Line_Law_Enforcement.pdf Shelf Number: 126658 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceCriminal InvestigationsPolice Manuals |
Author: Roberts, David J. Title: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems: Policy and Operational Guidance for Law Enforcement Summary: Law enforcement officers are often searching for vehicles that have been reported stolen, are suspected of being involved in criminal or terrorist activities, are owned by persons who are wanted by authorities, have failed to pay parking violations or maintain current vehicle license registration, and any of a number of other factors. Law enforcement agencies throughout the nation are increasingly adopting automated license plate recognition (ALPR) technologies, which function to automatically capture an image of the vehicle’s license plate, transform that image into alphanumeric characters, compare the plate number acquired to one or more databases of vehicles of interest, and alert the officer when a vehicle of interest has been observed, all within a matter of seconds This project was designed to assess ALPR implementation among law enforcement agencies in the United States, and to identify emerging implementation practices to provide operational and policy guidance to the field. A random sample of 444 local, state, and tribal law enforcement agencies was surveyed. A total of 305 agencies responded to the initial survey (68.7%). Threequarters of respondents (235 agencies, 77.0%) indicated that they were not using ALPR, while 70 agencies (23.0%) responded that they were using ALPR. A longer, more detailed survey was sent to the 70 agencies who confirmed they were using ALPR, and 40 agencies (57.1%) responded. Survey respondents had typically implemented mobile ALPR systems (95%), and were primarily using ALPR for auto theft (69%), vehicle and traffic enforcement (28%), and investigations (25%). Agencies reported increases in stolen vehicle recoveries (68%), arrests (55%), and productivity (50%). Fewer than half (48%) had developed ALPR policies. Over half (53%) updated their ALPR hot lists wirelessly, and nearly half (43%) updated their hot lists once each day. A total of 40% of respondents retain ALPR data for six months or less (n=16). Five respondents (13%) indicated they retain ALPR data indefinitely, while two indicated that retention is based on the storage capacity of the equipment installed. ALPR technology is a significant tool in the arsenal of law enforcement and public safety agencies. Realizing the core business values that ALPR promises, however, can only be achieved through proper planning, implementation, training, deployment, use, and management of the technology and the information it provides. Like all tools and technologies available to law enforcement, ALPR must also be carefully managed. Policies must be developed and strictly enforced to ensure the quality of the data, the security of the system, compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and the privacy of information gathered. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2012. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2012 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239604.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239604.pdf Shelf Number: 126737 Keywords: Automated License Plate Scanning (U.S.)Criminal InvestigationsMotor Vehicle TheftStolen VehiclesSurveillance Equipment |
Author: Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Title: Developing a Policy on the Use of Social Media in Intelligence and Investigative Activities: Guidance and Recommendations Summary: The advent of social media sites has created an environment of greater connection among people, businesses, and organizations, serving as a useful tool to keep in touch and interact with one another. These sites enable increased information sharing at a more rapid pace, building and enhancing relationships and helping friends, coworkers, and families to stay connected. Persons or groups can instantaneously share photos or videos, coordinate events, and/or provide updates that are of interest to their friends, family, or customer base. Social media sites can also serve as a platform to enable persons and groups to express their First Amendment rights, including their political ideals, religious beliefs, or views on government and government agencies. Many government entities, including law enforcement agencies, are also using social media sites as a tool to interact with the public, such as posting information on crime trends, updating citizens on community events, or providing tips on keeping citizens safe. Social media sites have become useful tools for the public and law enforcement entities, but criminals are also using these sites for wrongful purposes. Social media sites may be used to coordinate a criminal-related flash mob or plan a robbery, or terrorist groups may use social media sites to recruit new members and espouse their criminal intentions. Social media sites are increasingly being used to instigate or conduct criminal activity, and law enforcement personnel should understand the concept and function of these sites, as well as know how social media tools and resources can be used to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and investigate criminal activity. To ensure that information obtained from social media sites for investigative and criminal intelligence-related activity is used lawfully while also ensuring that individuals’ and groups’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected, law enforcement agencies should have a social media policy (or include the use of social media sites in other information-related policies). This social media policy should communicate how information from social media sites can be utilized by law enforcement, as well as the differing levels of engagement—such as apparent/overt, discrete, or covert—with subjects when law enforcement personnel access social media sites, in addition to specifying the authorization requirements, if any, associated with each level of engagement. These levels of engagement may range from law enforcement personnel “viewing” information that is publicly available on social media sites to the creation of an undercover profile to directly interact with an identified criminal subject online. Articulating the agency’s levels of engagement and authorization requirements is critical to agency personnel’s understanding of how information from social media sites can be used by law enforcement and is a key aspect of a social media policy. Social media sites and resources should be viewed as another tool in the law enforcement investigative toolbox and should be used in a manner that adheres to the same principles that govern all law enforcement activity, such as actions must be lawful and personnel must have a defined objective and a valid law enforcement purpose for gathering, maintaining, or sharing personally identifiable information (PII). In addition, any law enforcement action involving undercover activity (including developing an undercover profile on a social media site) should address supervisory approval, required documentation of activity, periodic reviews of activity, and the audit of undercover processes and behavior. Law enforcement agencies should also not collect or maintain the political, religious, or social views, associations, or activities of any individual or group, association, corporation, business, partnership, or organization unless there is a legitimate public safety purpose. These aforementioned principles help define and place limitations on law enforcement actions and ensure that individuals’ and groups’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are diligently protected. When law enforcement personnel adhere to these principles, they are ensuring that their actions are performed with the highest respect for the law and the community they serve, consequently fostering the community’s trust in and support for law enforcement action. The Developing a Policy on the Use of Social Media in Intelligence and Investigative Activities: Guidance and Recommendations is designed to guide law enforcement agency personnel through the development of a social media policy by identifying elements that should be considered when drafting a policy, as well as issues to consider when developing a policy, focusing on privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. This resource can also be used to modify and enhance existing policies to include social media information. All law enforcement agencies, regardless of size and jurisdiction, can benefit from the guidance identified in this resource. The key elements identified in this resource can be applied to “traditional” social media sites (such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) and are also applicable as different and new types of social media sites emerge and proliferate. As a policy is developed, the agency privacy officer and/or legal counsel should be consulted and involved in the process. Additionally, many agencies have an existing privacy policy that includes details on how to safeguard privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and an agency’s social media-related policy should also communicate how these protections will be upheld when using information obtained from social media sites. Social media sites have emerged as a method for instantaneous connection among people and groups; information obtained from these sites can also be a valuable resource for law enforcement in the prevention, identification, investigation, and prosecution of crimes. To that end, law enforcement leadership should ensure that their agency has a social media policy that outlines the associated procedures regarding the use of social media-related information in investigative and criminal intelligence activities, while articulating the importance of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. Moreover, the same procedures and prohibitions placed on law enforcement officers when patrolling the community or conducting an investigation should be in place when agency personnel are accessing, viewing, collecting, using, storing, retaining, and disseminating information obtained from social media sites. As these sites increase in popularity and usefulness, a social media policy is vital to ensuring that information from social media used in criminal intelligence and investigative activities is lawfully used, while also ensuring that individuals’ and groups’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are diligently protected. Details: Washington, DC: Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2013. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 29, 2013 at: https://it.ojp.gov/gist/Document/132 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://it.ojp.gov/gist/Document/132 Shelf Number: 128845 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceCriminal InvestigationsInformation TechnologyIntelligence GatheringMedia and CommunicationsSocial Media |
Author: U.S. Department of Defense. Inspector General Title: Evaluation of the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations Sexual Assault Investigations Summary: What We Did - We evaluated the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations’ (MCIOs’) sexual assault investigation training to determine whether it adequately supports the Department. Our evaluation focused on the following questions: • What sexual assault investigation training do the MCIOs provide? • How do the MCIOs ensure that sexual assault investigation training is effective? • How do the MCIOs leverage their resources and expertise? What We Found - Each MCIO provides initial baseline, periodic refresher, and advanced sexual assault investigation training to assigned criminal investigative personnel who may conduct sexual assault investigations. Between MCIOs, the training hours devoted to initial baseline training tasks varied. Further, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) initial baseline training materials did not cover four required essential training subtasks. All MCIO training academies measure the effectiveness of initial and advanced training courses, and they use the results to adjust training content to increase effectiveness. Conversely, the MCIOs do not measure the effectiveness of periodic refresher training. CID has attempted to consolidate MCIO advanced sexual assault investigation training. CID and NCIS share highly qualified and subject matter experts (HQE and SME) to assist with training course development and delivery. Also, CID assisted NCIS by instructing at their advanced sexual assault investigation training course. What We Recommend • The Director, NCIS, ensure lesson materials for initial sexual assault investigation training covers all essential training tasks. • The Director and Commanders of the MCIOs form a working group to review (1) initial baseline sexual assault investigation training programs to establish common criteria and minimum requirements, (2) periodic refresher sexual assault investigation training programs to establish common criteria and minimum requirements for measuring effectiveness, and (3) advanced sexual assault investigation training programs to further capitalize on efforts to leverage training resources and expertise. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense. Inspector General, 2013. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. DODIG-2013-043; Accessed August 5, 2013 at: http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-043.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-043.pdf Shelf Number: 129520 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsMilitaryRapeSexual Assaults (U.S.)Sexual Violence |
Author: UK Cabinet Office Title: The Report of the Detainee Inquiry Summary: On 6 July 2010, the Prime Minister told the House of Commons that the government was establishing an independent, judge-led inquiry - The Detainee Inquiry - to be chaired by Sir Peter Gibson, a former senior Court of Appeal Judge, that would: - look at whether Britain was implicated in the improper treatment of detainees, held by other countries, that may have occurred in the aftermath of 9/11. On January 18, 2012, the then Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Rt. Hon Kenneth Clarke QC MP statement to the House announced: - following consultation with Sir Peter Gibson, the Inquiry Chair, we have decided to bring the work of his Inquiry to a conclusion. We have agreed with Sir Peter that the Inquiry should provide the government with a report on its preparatory work to date, highlighting particular themes or issues which might be the subject of further examination. The government is clear that as much of this report as possible will be made public. This is the report of The Detainee Inquiry on its preparatory work. It highlights particular themes and issues that the Inquiry Panel believe might merit further examination. The Rt Hon Kenneth Clarke QC MP made a statement to Parliament about it on 19 December 2013. Details: London: Cabinet Office, 2013. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2014. Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267695/The_Report_of_the_Detainee_Inquiry_December_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 131753 Keywords: CounterterrorismCriminal InvestigationsInterrogationInterviewingPolice Interrogation |
Author: British Columbia. Missing Women Commission of Inquiry Title: Forsaken: The Report of the Missing Women Commission of Inquiry Summary: The Commission Report consists of four volumes: Volume I: The Women, Their Lives and the Framework of Inquiry: Setting the Context for Understanding and Change. It provides the framework for the Inquiry's factual findings and conclusions and for its broader policy advisory responsibilities, which focus on recommendations for forward-looking change. Emphasis has been placed on developing a contextualized framework: context is the setting for a particular idea or event, a set of circumstances or facts that surround an event or situation that give it meaning. The missing and murdered women investigations were not isolated events; they must be situated and assessed relative to a bigger picture. This contextual framework comprises of four elements: The international, national and provincial dimensions of the crisis of missing and murdered women; - The women as individuals; - The women as a group and their lives in the DTES; and - The legal and policy framework for police investigations of missing women and suspected multiple homicides. Volume II: Nobodies: How and Why We Failed the Missing and Murdered Women. It contains my findings of facts and conclusions pertaining to the police investigations framed by four main parts: - The police investigation into the assault on Ms. Anderson and the decision to stay proceedings against Pickton in January 1998; - An overview of the missing and murdered women investigations designed to serve as a narrative account upon which further analysis is carried out, including a timeline of key events to assist the reader; - An analysis of the seven main critical police failures; and - An analysis of the underlying causes of these critical police failures. Due to its size, Volume II is printed in two volumes: Volume IIA and Volume IIB. A summary of my findings of facts and conclusions is included at the end of Volume IIB. Volume III: Gone, but not Forgotten: Building the Women's Legacy of Safety Together. This volume summarizes the information gathered through the study commission process and sets out my recommendations for reform. The framing of the recommendations is closely tied to the factual conclusions that I reached in Volume II. The discussion and recommendations are set out in relation to what I identify as the ten components of the missing women's legacy: - Laying the foundation for effective change: acknowledging the harm and fostering healing and reconciliation; - Renewing our commitment to equal protection of the law through practical measures; - Listening, learning and responding: strategies to prevent violence against marginalized women in the DTES and other urban areas; - Standing together and moving forward: strategies to prevent violence against Aboriginal and rural women; - Fostering innovation and standardization: a framework for best practices in missing person investigations; - Enhancing police investigations of missing persons and suspected multiple homicides; - Committing to a regional police force in Greater Vancouver; - Facilitating effective multi-jurisdictional responses to crime; - Ensuring police accountability to the communities they serve; and - Assuring the women's legacy: implementation, change management and evaluation. A summary of my recommendations is included at the end of Volume III and at the end of this Executive Summary. Volume IV: The Commission's Process. It contains materials related to the Commission's process and is meant to provide a public record of the work that led to the preparation of this report. The first section is a detailed overview of the Commission's approach to the hearings and study commission processes. The remaining sections provide information about the Commission's work including the Terms of Reference, a list of Commission personnel, a list of Participants and Counsel, practice and procedure guidelines and directives, a list of witnesses at the evidentiary hearings, a list of oral and written submissions to the study commission, and a list of Commission studies and reports. Details: Victoria, BC: Missing Women Commission on Inquiry, 2012. 180p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2014 at: http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/public_inquiries/docs/Forsaken-ES.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Canada URL: http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/public_inquiries/docs/Forsaken-ES.pdf Shelf Number: 132100 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsHomicideMissing PersonsMissing WomenMurderSerial MurderViolence Against Women |
Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009 Summary: Since 2001, the intelligence community has sought methods to improve the process for uncovering and thwarting domestic terrorist plots before they occur. Vital to these efforts are the more than 17,000 state and local U.S. law enforcement agencies whose role in the counterterrorism process has become increasingly recognized. As part of an on-going study for the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), this report examines open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009 to determine the types of information and activities that led to (or could have led to) their discovery. Our findings provide law enforcement, homeland security officials, and policy makers with an improved understanding of the types of clues and methods that should be emphasized to more reliably prevent terrorist attacks, including the need to: -Recognize the importance of law enforcement and public vigilance in thwarting terror attacks. More than 80% of foiled terrorist plots were discovered via observations from law enforcement or the general public. Tips included reports of plots as well as reports of suspicious activity, such as pre-operational surveillance, para-military training, smuggling activities, and the discovery of suspicious documents. - Continue to investigate Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM), but do not overlook other groups, and pay particular attention to plots by "lone wolves." Less than half of U.S. terror plots examined had links to AQAM, and many non-AQAM plots, primarily those with white supremacist or anti-government/militia ties, rivaled AQAM plots in important ways. Additionally, plots by single actors ("lone wolves") have proven particularly successful, reaching execution nearly twice as often as plots by groups. - Ensure processes and training are in place that enable law enforcement personnel to identify terrorist activity during routine criminal investigations. Almost one in five plots were foiled "accidentally" during investigations into seemingly unrelated crimes. Training is needed to recognize when ordinary crimes may be connected to terrorism. - Work to establish good relations with local communities and avoid tactics that might alienate them. Approximately 40% of plots were thwarted as a result of tips from the public and informants. Establishing trust with persons in or near radical movements is jeopardized by tactics such as racial, ethnic, religious, or ideological profiling. - Support "quality assurance" processes to ensure initial clues are properly pursued and findings shared. Investigating leads and sharing information across agencies led to foiling the vast majority of terrorist plots in our sample. Similarly, breakdowns in these basic processes led to lost opportunities to thwart some of the worst attacks, including 9/11. - Expand the federal standards for categorizing suspicious activity reports (SARs). A large majority of the initial clue types we identified, including public and informant tips, as well as law enforcement observations made during routine criminal investigations, are only indirectly referenced in the current national SAR standards. Expanding them would enable more comprehensive reporting and greater information sharing of potential terrorist activity. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Shelf Number: 132707 Keywords: Counter-terrorismCriminal InvestigationsHomeland SecurityIntelligence GatheringTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and Characterize Terrorist Activitiy. Final Report Summary: For the past decade, members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities have been working to develop methods and processes to identify and thwart terrorist plots. As part of these efforts, state and local law enforcement agencies have been increasingly recognized as the "first-line preventers" of terrorism (Kelling & Bratton, 2006). The network of over 17,000 law enforcement agencies, including regional and state fusion centers, represents a resource that exponentially increases the United States' ability to identify, report, and analyze information that is potentially terrorist-related. However, these agencies also face ongoing challenges in this counterterrorism role. Perhaps the most pressing issue has been the lack of coordination and standardization of counterterrorism practices at the state and local levels. For example, in the absence of federal guidance, local jurisdictions have often developed different procedures for collecting and prioritizing suspicious activity reports (SARs) - reports of activities and behaviors potentially related to terrorism collected from incident reports, field interviews, 911 calls, and tips from the public. The lack of standardization has impeded the sharing and analysis of such information (Suspicious Activity Report Support and Implementation Project, 2008). Federal agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Defense (DOD), among others, have made it part of their mission to standardize this process. One of the first steps was the introduction of the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), which created "a unified process for reporting, tracking, and accessing of SARs" (National Strategy for Information Sharing [NSIS], 2007, p. A1-7). This project, funded by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), considered the collection and use of SARs at the state and local level. We assess how tips and clues generated from state and local sources have been used to prevent terrorist plots, assess the strengths and weaknesses of data sources from which SARs are often derived, and make recommendations for improving the collection, processing, and evaluation of tips and clues reported at the local level. The project was conducted in three phases. Phase I included an analysis of publicly-reported terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009, including both foiled and executed plots, to determine what types of suspicious behaviors and means of reporting most frequently led to (or could have led to) their discovery and ultimate prevention (Strom et al., 2010). The report published from Phase I examined open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets. In Phase II, we conducted interviews with members of the law enforcement, fusion center, and intelligence communities to gain an improved understanding for how these agencies collect, process, and analyze SARs. In addition, we sought to gain more perspective on how these agencies could better use the information gathered and what challenges they face with respect to SARs. Phase III of the study assessed the primary data sources for SARs, the processes used to collect and analyze SARs, and approaches used to prioritize SARs. We also developed a set of recommendations that can be used by law enforcement and fusion center personnel to improve their practices of collecting, managing and prioritizing SARs. The work conducted across these phases resulted in a set of recommendations and conclusions, which we believe can improve the SAR process. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 125754 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Criminal Investigations Fusion CentersHomeland Security Intelligence Gathering Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Hoffer, Tia Title: Operational Safety Considerations While Investigating Child Sex Offenders. A Handbook for Law Enforcement Volume 1 Summary: The danger to the law enforcement officer who is initiating a search warrant or arrest of a Child Sex Offender (CSO) is most likely underestimated. CSOs are often perceived to be less dangerous and nonviolent. However, CSOs pose a significant risk to themselves and in turn can potentially be a danger to law enforcement officers. This handbook, based on a review by the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit III- Crimes Against Children of over 100 cases of CSOs who committed suicide, is the first of a two part handbook addressing salient operational and safety factors that might arise between law enforcement and CSOs. A Volume II will provide specific skills and techniques that can be utilized by law enforcement in gathering information about potential risk factors impacting CSO behavior. Details: Quantico, VA: FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit III, Crimes Against Children, 2012. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2014 at: http://leb.fbi.gov/2013/may/officers-and-child-sex-offenders-operational-safety-considerations Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://leb.fbi.gov/2013/may/officers-and-child-sex-offenders-operational-safety-considerations Shelf Number: 134176 Keywords: Child Sex OffendersChild Sexual AbuseCriminal InvestigationsPolice InvestigationsPolice Training (U.S.)Suicide Prevention |
Author: Council of Europe. Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) Title: Typologies Report on Laundering the Proceeds of Organised Crime Summary: 1. The project to examine the laundering methods used by organised crime (OC) was approved by the 41st MONEYVAL Plenary in April 2013. It was agreed that the project team should examine the methods used by organised criminal groups to launder illegally earned profits and should try to assess potential regional vulnerabilities. It was also agreed that trends, methods, red flags and indicators, the means of identification and analysis of organised crime money flows should all be addressed in the report in order to enhance the capabilities of competent authorities in such cases. 2. Two expert meetings were held in the context of this research: the inaugural meeting of delegations was organised in October 2013 in Strasbourg; this was followed by a second meeting, bringing together prosecutors and judges in May 2014 in San Marino. 3. The reason for conducting this research is the recognition that OC presents one of the major threats to the Rule of Law in Europe and globally. A large percentage of all the criminal proceeds that are laundered world-wide are laundered by or on behalf of OC. 4. The report highlights a number of significant challenges to the effective investigation and prosecution of laundering the funds derived from organised crime and achieving final confiscation of assets. Some of these problems arise due to a lack of resources or relevant expertise, some due to reluctance of prosecutors in some jurisdictions to tackle difficult cases and some are caused by the very nature of the laundering techniques themselves. The main problems identified were: - Lack of financial, accounting and IT expertise; - Intelligence gaps; - Lack of adequate risk analysis; - Inadequate domestic coordination; - Failure to use the full range of powers and practices available; - The perception of some prosecutors that they have always to identify a specific predicate offence from which the proceeds are derived for a successful 3rd party prosecution; - Reluctance of prosecutors to tackle difficult cases; - Delay in applying provisional measures rendering any subsequent confiscation orders less effective; - Transnational transactions and difficulties caused by mutual legal assistance; - Exploitation of new technologies by organised crime groups; - Lack of transparency of corporate vehicles. 5. The report sets out a number of recommendations on measures that jurisdictions can adopt in order to improve the investigation and prosecution of OC-related ML and the final confiscation of their criminal proceeds. In particular, the report highlights the need to make full use of the powers available to investigators and prosecutors. The recommended measures include: - Ensuring that there is more high-level commitment to prosecuting OC ML and pursuing deterrent confiscation orders in those cases; - Including any special issues raised by OC in the ML national risk assessment; - Ratifying the Warsaw Convention and implementing the revised Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 2012 (in particular Recommendation 30 (Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative agencies)); - Focusing on confiscation; - Focusing on third party money laundering; - Making full use of FIU powers and expertise; - Using financial profiling, trained specialists and expert witnesses; - Developing national cooperation, coordination and feed-back and improving domestic information exchange; - Expediting international information exchange; - Increasing the transparency of information on the real owners of companies and trusts; - Improving financial supervision; - Utilising media campaigns, particularly in relation to the risks of persons being exploited unintentionally by OC as money mules. 6. The report draws conclusions on trends from the responses received. It is noted that OCGs will in practice use all available means to launder the proceeds of crime and have the ability to adapt quickly to changing law enforcement and AML/CFT environments. Nonetheless, a number of particular trends were identified, including exploitation of poorly regulated financial institutions and DNFBPs, as well as an increasing use of international transactions by OCGs. The main trends are, however, mostly typical of money laundering generally, but specifically in the OC context include: - Exploitation of poorly regulated sectors; - Development of transnational infrastructures to launder funds; - Use of legal persons to hide criminally derived funds; - Use of professionals; - Use of new technologies. 7. The report assesses some of the techniques that have proved successful in investigating and prosecuting the laundering of the proceeds from OC and achieving final confiscations. The analysis considers risk identification as a strategic starting point, ways of detecting potential OC-related transactions (both at the level of FIUs and LEAs), the analytical processes involved, financial investigations and financial profiling and also covers challenges to and best practices for the achievement of convictions and confiscations. 8. It appears that OC and ML are rarely analysed at a strategic level by decision-makers together in jurisdictions. The report suggests that a better collective understanding of the OC vulnerabilities and threats is critical for those who are responsible for overall resource allocation for investigation and prosecution of OC cases. 9. The ability of the reporting entities themselves to detect OCG-related funds for reporting purposes seems limited. Financial institutions rely typically on the information available on the internet or from public and commercial databases. 10. At the FIU level, in order to identify potential OCG indicators, the analysts mostly rely on the number of persons involved in suspicious transaction reports (STR). There are no distinctive procedures for OCG-related STRs but, when recognised, such cases are prioritised and analysed in more detail. 11. Financial investigations are always a key element in ML cases, whether the proceeds result from OC activities or not. This survey revealed that, when deciding upon the initiation of parallel financial investigations, there are no differences between an organised crime case and any other case. 12. In some jurisdictions, the criteria for initiation of a parallel financial investigation is provided by legislation and can be activated automatically in proceeds-generating cases. In other jurisdictions the decision is taken by investigators and prosecutors on a case-by-case basis. There are no special investigative powers dedicated to financial investigations carried out in OC cases. The report concludes that wider use of the power to monitor bank accounts and/or to postpone transactions should increase effectiveness in the asset tracing and freezing processes. 13. One useful tool in asset recovery which has been identified is the use of financial profiles. These are descriptions of the investigated persons' licit income compared with their expenditure and lifestyle. Building such profiles can better assist the authorities to identify unexplained wealth. Nonetheless, such profiles are not routinely conducted in OC financial investigations. In some jurisdictions they are made exclusively in the pre-trial stage and do not always constitute admissible evidence. In order to create accurate profiles, LEAs may need access to a variety of information held by others, including Tax, Customs and the FIU. In some jurisdictions this access is on-line; in others formal requests to another authority need to be made. 14. There appears to be a direct link between the international element of ML cases related to OCG, and the duration of the investigation and prosecution processes. These processes frequently become prolonged because of delays in receiving responses to mutual legal assistance requests. The report notes that prosecutors may sometimes request mutual legal assistance, where the evidence required may be capable of proof in other ways, through the more focused use of domestically available circumstantial evidence. 15. In order to increase timeliness and success of prosecutions, some jurisdictions have introduced special courts and/or prosecutors' offices as part of the judicial system, which have nationwide competences and jurisdiction for a series of specific offenses. This system has the advantage of reducing the possibility of local influence and corruption and deepening specialisation of judges and prosecutors in OC-related cases. 16. The report found that various FIUs and other LEAs, with long-standing experience in the ML area (including in its OC component), are capable individually of addressing the issues related to the fight against the legalisation of OC profits, but that often these efforts are fragmented and the overall outcome is limited. The report identifies obstacles in this area. Some of the most frequently noted difficulties related to obtaining evidence from abroad (especially from offshore jurisdictions) and to the continuing lack of transparency of the ownership of investigated corporate vehicles. The complexity of the financial flows which can be involved create particular challenges for investigators and prosecutors. 17. On a more positive note, valuable tools for OC asset tracing, freezing and confiscation were identified in the course of the research. These include exploitation of the analysis by the FIUs, use of FIU powers (monitoring of transactions, postponement), and use of financial profiling techniques. In addition, the more active use of Joint Investigations Teams (JITs) in appropriate transnational OC investigations is recommended. 18. The report identifies that some jurisdictions achieve success in autonomous ML cases without the necessity to establish precisely from which predicate offenses the laundered property comes. These cases are usually based on inferences drawn from facts and circumstances. This is particularly helpful in OC cases. However, the survey also indicated that there still remains resistance in many jurisdictions to challenging the courts with these types of autonomous and stand-alone cases. The report explains some of the jurisprudence in England and Wales on autonomous and stand-alone ML that has been followed in several other jurisdictions. The case studies also describe some of the successes that have been achieved following this line of jurisprudence. It is strongly recommended that more jurisdictions challenge their courts with cases based on this line of jurisprudence where there are OC connections. 19. The infiltration of financial institutions by OC through corruption (or by other means) is sometimes associated with identified criminal activities, such as illicit waste disposal, trafficking in endangered species, illegal investment in real estate projects, the facilitation of illegal immigration, drug and weapons trafficking, document counterfeiting and crimes which can be facilitated only with the authorisations of local or national administrations. While the incidence of this finding is not measured, it is considered that jurisdictions where the above-mentioned predicate offenses are prevalent, should be more alert to the risks of OC infiltrating financial institutions for ML purposes. 20. Finally the report focuses on typologies of ML cases where OC proceeds were laundered. It appears that the most common proceeds-generating crimes are of a financial nature (all forms of fiscal frauds, including tax evasion and internet-related frauds). The survey revealed that the FIUs' capacity and expertise in financial analysis is underused by law enforcement. Details: Strasbourg: COE, 2015. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Typologies/MONEYVAL(2015)20_typologies_launderingtheproceedsoforganisedcrime.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Typologies/MONEYVAL(2015)20_typologies_launderingtheproceedsoforganisedcrime.pdf Shelf Number: 136350 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCriminal InvestigationsFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime |
Author: McEwen, Tom Title: Evaluation of the Phoenix Homicide Clearance Project. Volume 1 Summary: This report prepared by the Institute for Law and Justice, Inc. (ILJ) provides the results of an evaluation of the Homicide Clearance Project in the Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department. In 2004, the department received a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance providing support for the assignment of four crime scene specialists directly to the department's Homicide Unit. Responsibilities of the crime scene specialists were to collect evidence at homicide scenes, prepare scene reports, develop scene diagrams, and other supportive activities. Prior to the project, homicide investigators were responsible for evidence collection, which reduced the time they could devote to investigations. The primary objective of the Homicide Clearance Project was to improve homicide clearance rates by increasing investigative time through the addition of the four crime scene specialists. ILJ evaluated the Homicide Clearance Project under a grant provided by the National Institute of Justice. As described in this report, the evaluation consisted of process and impact assessments of the project. Because of the excellent cooperation of the Phoenix Police Department, ILJ expanded the evaluation to conduct research on several other aspects of homicide investigations, including an analysis of investigative procedures for closed cases, a summary of obstacles faced in solving open cases, a comparison of homicide characteristics in Phoenix with other research studies, a detailed breakdown of evidence collected at homicide scenes, and a review of the role of forensic evidence in homicide investigations and trials. Transfers of the four crime scene specialists were effective on July 1, 2004. The crime scene specialists were assigned to two of the four investigative squads within the homicide unit. They began on-the-job training immediately upon their transfers by accompanying investigators to scenes and observing the collection and storage of evidence. The training proceeded quickly because they were familiar with homicide scenes and because they generally knew departmental procedures from their years of experience in the crime laboratory. By September 2004, the crime scene specialists were able to handle homicide scenes with minimal supervision from investigators, and they had learned how to prepare scene reports documenting the evidence. Prior to the grant, the role of crime scene specialists was limited to photographs and latent prints. Investigators were responsible for evidence collection. Investigators marked each item of evidence, placed the evidence in appropriate evidence containers, transported the evidence to headquarters, and turned the evidence over to the property room. They later prepared scene reports that described the evidence collection process and provided details on each item of evidence collected (type of evidence, description, exact location, etc.). Assignment of crime scene specialists to the unit was seen as a way to relieve a considerable amount of workload from investigators. The decision to assign the four crime scene specialists to two of the four squads provided an opportunity to compare performance between the two pairs of squads. As with other investigative units, the primary performance measure was homicide clearance rates-the percentage of cases that homicide investigators solve. The hypothesis was that the squads with crime scene specialists would do better than the other squads compared against their performance prior to the grant project. In theory, investigators in the experimental squads would have more time for investigations, which in turn would lead to higher clearance rates. The comparison squads would continue to operate as in the past with investigators having responsibility for evidence collection and with crime scene specialists assigned to take photographs and dust for latent prints. With the Homicide Clearance Project, the Phoenix Police Department was also testing whether crime scene specialists could work effectively within the environment of the homicide unit. It was the department's first test for assigning civilian personnel from the crime laboratory to an investigative unit. The crime scene specialists reported to supervisory personnel who headed the experimental squads. The department also wanted to be sure that the four crime scene specialists were capable of preparing the same quality of scene reports that homicide investigators produced. The evaluation addressed both these objectives. Details: Alexandria, VA: Institute for Law and Justice, 2009. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.ilj.org/publications/docs/EvalReport_Volume_I.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.ilj.org/publications/docs/EvalReport_Volume_I.pdf Shelf Number: 136776 Keywords: Clearance RatesCrime Scene InvestigationCriminal InvestigationsHomicidesPolice Investigations |
Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: The US legal system on data protection in the field of law enforcement. Safeguards, rights and remedies for EU citizens Summary: In US law, there are a number of different legal sources that govern data protection in the field of federal law enforcement. This study first considers the two most important sources of data protection law-the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution and the Privacy Act of 1974. It then turns to the most significant methods of information collection that are available for ordinary criminal investigations and national security investigations and the data protection guarantees set down under the laws authorizing and regulating such information collection. The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the government. Reasonableness is established if the search or seizure is conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, that is, a judicial order based on a showing of probable cause and on a particular description of the property to be searched and the items to be seized. Reasonableness can also be established if one of the exceptions to the warrant requirements exists. In the data protection context, however, the application of the Fourth Amendment is relatively limited because of the third-party records doctrine which holds that individuals do not have an expectation of privacy in personal data that they voluntarily turn over to third parties like financial institutions and communications providers. With regard to EU citizens, the Supreme Court has held that foreign citizens resident abroad are not covered by the Fourth Amendment. Among U.S. laws, the Privacy Act of 1974 is the closest analogue to a European data protection law in that it seeks to regulate comprehensively personal data processing, albeit only with respect to federal government departments and agencies. It regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of all types of personal information, by all types of federal agencies, including law enforcement agencies. At a general level, the Privacy Act contains most of the elements of the EU right to personal data protection. However, it only protects US citizens and permanent residents, not EU citizens. Furthermore, there are a number of exemptions available specifically for law enforcement agencies. As a result, the benefits of the proposed legislation on judicial redress for EU citizens are unclear. The proposed legislation contemplates three types of law suits, two of which are designed to protect the right of access to and correction of personal data, and one of which enables individuals to obtain compensation for unlawful disclosures of personal data. Since law enforcement agencies commonly exempt their data bases from the access requirements of the Privacy Act, the right of action for intentional or willful disclosures that cause actual damage is the only one that would be available on a general basis. In investigations involving ordinary crime, there are at least three different methods of personal data collection available to law enforcement officials: (1) use of private sources like commercial data brokers; (2) court and administrative subpoenas; (3) electronic surveillance and access to electronic communications based on a court order under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. These information-gathering methods afford the same level of data protection for US and EU citizens. With respect to EU data protection law, however, some of these methods contain relatively few data protection guarantees. In the case of private sources of personal data, this is attributable to the absence of a comprehensive data protection scheme in the private sector and the vast quantities of personal information freely available to market actors and, consequently, also to law enforcement officials. With respect to the subpoena power and access to communications metadata and subscriber records (under the Stored Communications Act and the Pen Register Act), the lack of significant data protection guarantees is associated with the standard of "relevance" to any type of criminal investigation and the permissive application of that standard by the courts. The law and jurisprudence of "relevance," in turn, is driven by the failure of US law to recognize a robust privacy interest in the personal data held by corporate entities and other third parties. In investigations involving national security threats, which can involve both an intelligence and a law enforcement component, there are a number of additional means available to the government: (1) a special type of administrative subpoena known as a "national security letter"; (2) surveillance authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); (3) any other form of intelligence gathering authorized by Executive Order 12,333 (and not covered by FISA). The information gathered through such methods can be shared with criminal prosecutors if relevant for law enforcement purposes. Foreign intelligence gathering, both inside and outside the United States, follows a two-track scheme, one for US persons and another for non-US persons. With the exception of FISA electronic and physical surveillance orders, the data protection guarantees afforded to non-US persons are minimal. The stated intent of Presidential Policy Directive 28 is to provide for stronger personal data protection for non-US persons, but it is difficult to come to any conclusions at this point in time on what effect it will have. More generally, even with respect to US persons, personal data protection under foreign intelligence law raises a couple of questions. The first concerns the point in time when the right to privacy is burdened by government action. The US government has suggested that in the case of bulk collection of personal data, harm to the privacy interest only occurs after the personal data is used to search, or results from a search of, the information included in the data base. This position stands in marked contrast with EU law, where it is well established that bulk collection, even before the personal data is accessed, is a serious interference with the right to personal data protection because of the number of people and the amount of personal data involved. The second question concerns the conditions under which personal data can be shared between intelligence and law enforcement officials. In the realm of data processing by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the European courts have emphasized that intrusive surveillance can only be conducted to combat serious threats that are carefully defined in law. They have also held that the information that results from such surveillance can only be used to combat those serious threats, whether to take national security measures or to prosecute the associated criminal offenses. In US law, by contrast, the law allows for intelligence to be transferred to the police and criminal prosecutors for any type of law enforcement purpose.. Details: Brussels: European Union, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 21, 2015 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519215/IPOL_STU(2015)519215_EN.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 137049 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsData ProtectionFourth AmendmentIntelligence GatheringPrivacy Act of 1974Search and Seizure |
Author: INTERPOL Environmental Crime Programme Title: Environmental Crime and its Convergence with other Serious Crimes Summary: The capacity for INTERPOL Member Countries to effectively respond to environmental crime when it intersects with other serious1 crimes is a common theme that arises when INTERPOL engages with its members. The nature of "crime convergence" (also referred to as "threat convergence") raises a number of complexities and challenges in all phases of enforcement, from detection and disruption to the dismantling of criminal syndicates. In fact, it is one of the greatest challenges cited by officers from environment and policing agencies at regional and international investigative meetings and one that they all seek to understand and address. Key INTERPOL partners are also aware of the challenges associated with convergence, and are calling for greater understanding of crime convergence and law enforcement countermeasures. To stimulate discussion on this topic, this report provides insight into the nature of crime convergence within the context of environmental crime, where it is becoming increasingly apparent and complex. An example is seen when poly-crime syndicates traffic in a range of illicit goods in addition to environmental products. The report also examines the types of significant crimes that Member Countries have brought to INTERPOL's attention through their environmental crime investigations. The nature of crime convergence is subsequently discussed in terms of its challenges as well as the opportunities it presents to law enforcement. The report makes a number of suggestions on how agencies can better respond to convergence in transnational and national operations. In doing so, it promotes an integrated multi-disciplined and multi-agency law enforcement approach that is both strategic and operational in nature. The report concludes with a number of practical strategies for consideration by enforcement agencies. Details: The Hague: INTERPOL, 2015. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2015 at: http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Resources Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Resources Shelf Number: 137366 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsEnvironmental CrimeOffenses Against the EnvironmentWildlife Crime |
Author: Baughman, Benjamin Title: A Study of Rape Investigation Files Involving Female Survivors: A Comparison of Allegations Deemed False and Genuine. Summary: Determining the veracity of a rape allegation in the absence of incontrovertible evidence is highly problematic and complicated by vagaries of surrounding issues. The purpose of the present study was to utilise a unique, multi-faceted approach with a representative US complete dataset (n=351) to identify the most prominent, distinguishing characteristics between genuine and false allegations. There are reasons to suggest that false allegations will be distinguishable from genuine rapes. The reasons include psychological dynamics such as a false allegers' (not a survivor of rape) reliance on rape myths for their fictitious account. In contrast, genuine reports of rape tend to encompass more specific behavioural details. 17% of the present population were objectively determined to be fabricated. Published results have indicated genuine rapes having a higher quantity and quality of reported actions. Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) was used to identify and categorise co-occurring behaviours, finding thematic consistency in genuine rapes. In contrast, false allegations revealed an erratic structure indicative of the fabricated stories' reliance on rape myths. Thematic structures are consistent with published findings which lends support to the grouping procedure utilised for this thesis. Additionally, a mean number of 6.6 behaviours in false allegations compared to the 9.3 behaviours controlled by the offender in genuine cases were observed. Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with base coordinates (POSAC) allows for using a combination of the most reliably distinguishing characteristics across cases. A developed model provided a unique method of exploring the qualitative and quantitative variations across cases. The eight most distinguishing behaviours were used to calculate a Behavioural Profile Score (BPS) for each incident and supported published results. As another potential means of assessing plausibility, analysis showed that genuine reports of rape contained greater detail as measured by the number of specific behaviours described. Although this thesis has various limitations, the results of three very distinctly different procedures all indicate distinguishable characteristics between genuine and false allegations. Additionally, it demonstrates the significance of myths in shaping actions and provides indications to why so many cases are indeterminate. Details: Huddersfield, UK: University of Huddersfield, 2016. 272p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed March 17, 2016: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/27856/ Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/27856/ Shelf Number: 138311 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsRapeRape VictimsSexual ViolenceVictims of Crime |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Missing Persons and Unidentified Remains: Opportunities May Exist to Share Information More Efficiently Summary: Every year, more than 600,000 people are reported missing, and hundreds of human remains go unidentified. Two primary federal databases supported by DOJ - NCIC and NamUs - contain data related to missing and unidentified persons to help solve these cases. NCIC contains criminal justice information accessed by authorized agencies to assist with daily investigations. NamUs information can be used by law enforcement, medical examiners, coroners, and the general public to help with long-term missing and unidentified persons cases. Senate Report 113-181 (accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015) includes a provision for GAO to review NCIC and NamUs. This report describes the access to and use of missing and unidentified persons information contained in NCIC and NamUs, and the extent to which there are opportunities to improve the use of this information. GAO reviewed NCIC and NamUs data, and relevant state and federal statutes. GAO also conducted nongeneralizeable interviews with stakeholders in three states, selected in part on state laws. What GAO Recommends To allow for more efficient use of missing and unidentified persons information, GAO recommends that DOJ evaluate options to share information between NCIC and NamUs. DOJ disagreed because it believes it lacks the necessary legal authority. GAO believes DOJ can study options for sharing information within the confines of its legal framework, and therefore believes the recommendation remains valid. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-515: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677717.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677717.pdf Shelf Number: 139304 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsInformation SharingMissing Persons |
Author: Kowalick, Phil Title: Opportunities abound abroad: Optimising our criminal intelligence system overseas Summary: Criminal intelligence (CrimInt) is so useful in serious criminal investigations that it's difficult to envisage a situation where it shouldn't be sought and used if it's available. This special report argues that Australia's current arrangements for gathering and disseminating CrimInt overseas are suboptimal. While additional resources are needed to address this condition, there's also a need to streamline priority setting and associated collection requirements, provide ways to evaluate and better coordinate the collection of information and intelligence product, and expand opportunities to improve training in CrimInt. The paper provides recommendations to improve the quality and utility of our overseas CrimInt effort for law enforcement, policy and regulatory agencies. Details: Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/opportunities-abound-abroad-optimising-our-criminal-intelligence-system-overseas/SR90_CrimInt.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/opportunities-abound-abroad-optimising-our-criminal-intelligence-system-overseas/SR90_CrimInt.pdf Shelf Number: 139615 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceCriminal InvestigationsPolice Intelligence |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Title: A Review of ATF's Undercover Storefront Operations Summary: In this review the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) use of undercover storefront operations - an investigative technique in which law enforcement operates a fake business or establishment from a location where illicit merchandise is exchanged or services are rendered. In 2013 ATF's use of undercover storefront operations came under scrutiny after news reporting about a storefront operation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin described numerous problems, including the theft of firearms, improper handling of sensitive information, and the alleged targeting of persons with disabilities. These and other reports about flaws in ATF's storefront operations prompted members of Congress to request the OIG to initiate this review. The OIG examined five ATF undercover storefront operations to: (1) determine whether there are any systemic deficiencies in ATF's storefront policies; and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of ATF's Monitored Case Program (MCP) as an oversight tool for the storefront operations. ATF established the MCP to provide for heightened management scrutiny of the agency's most sensitive cases. We selected five undercover operations that continued or began after the inception of the MCP; these operated in Boston, Milwaukee, Pensacola, St. Louis, and Wichita. The storefront in Boston was mobile and operated from a cargo van. In addition, due to allegations that ATF was targeting persons with disabilities for enforcement action, we examined this issue at ATF's storefront in Portland, Oregon, as well as the other storefronts identified above. Our review determined that while undercover operations can be an important component of ATF's efforts to fight violent crime, ATF failed to devote sufficient attention to how it was managing its undercover storefront operations. It lacked adequate policies and guidance for its agents, and in some cases supervision, necessary to appropriately address the risks associated with the use of this complex investigative technique. Although we did not find overarching problems with ATF's storefront policies as revised following disclosure of problems with the Milwaukee storefront, we determined that ATF should make additional changes to further improve them. We also found that ATF needed to make adjustments to its MCP to better focus on the most significant risks in ATF's investigative operations, including storefronts. We found no evidence that ATF targeted or used individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities in its storefront investigations because of their disability. However, we determined during the course of this review that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had failed to apply Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, which prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities, to its federal law enforcement activities. This Act imposes important compliance responsibilities on DOJ's law enforcement components, which include ATF, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). When we inquired with ATF and the other DOJ law enforcement components about their compliance responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act, we found that they lacked policies that addressed the Rehabilitation Act's applicability to law enforcement operations. The OIG raised this important issue with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and, on September 3, 2015 the OIG wrote to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General to request quarterly updates on DOJ's efforts to ensure compliance with the Rehabilitation Act. The OIG intends to carefully monitor DOJ's progress in meeting its significant duties under the Act. We provided 13 recommendations to assist ATF with its storefront operations. ATF concurred with all of them and has committed to their full implementation. They address the following issues: initiation, planning, safety and security, oversight, intelligence, vulnerable populations, revisions to the Storefront Investigations Manual, and training. In addition to strengthening ATF's policies, improving the MCP, and helping ATF and DOJ to meet their obligations under federal disability law, the recommendations will assist ATF to address three other areas of concern we identified during the review. The first involves predication and targeting. We believe ATF must do a better job in future storefront operations defining the crime problem that the storefront is designed to address and explaining how the strategy underlying it will lead to the apprehension of persons warranting federal prosecution. Our recommendations request ATF to make clear in the storefront initiation paperwork how the storefront will be targeted and how the resulting prosecutions will serve a substantial federal interest. Second, ATF underestimated the level of experience, training, and expertise necessary to manage and oversee its storefront operations, which led to mistakes. Undercover storefront operations are complex and require the management of significant manpower and financial resources. ATF's assignment of inexperienced and shifting staff to run and supervise these operations without adequate Headquarters support and oversight had predictably negative consequences. Our recommendations request that ATF's Undercover Branch designate undercover agents/case agents with significant storefront expertise to work on-scene for the initial period of each storefront's operation to assist with planning, set-up, and early operations; that ATF minimize the turnover of supervisors during the operations; and that at least one undercover agent or the case agent on a storefront team have completed advanced undercover training, including training on storefront operations, before the storefront becomes operational. Third, and closely related to the second issue above, is the problem told to us about ATF Headquarters' historic reluctance to intrude on the domain of its Special Agents-in-Charge. We believe that in addition to supplementing the expertise available for storefront operations, ATF Headquarters units - the Special Operations Division and its Undercover Branch - need to be stakeholders in future operations and provide active oversight of them. ATF undercover storefront operations should not proceed unless experts within these units concur that they are properly designed and are being implemented appropriately. We have included recommendations in our report to encourage this oversight. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Oversight & Review Division 16-06: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/o1606.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/o1606.pdf Shelf Number: 140265 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsIllegal GoodsLaw Enforcement InvestigationsUndercover Operations |
Author: Big Brother Watch Title: Private Investigators The use of private investigators by councils, public authorities and government departments in the United Kingdom Summary: The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 introduced important safeguards in the use of surveillance powers by local authorities. The requirement of prior judicial authorisation is an important change in the law and one we wholeheartedly support. However, as this report highlights, the scope of public surveillance using private investigators risks undermining these protections. Of particular concern is the number of cases where private investigators have been commissioned, yet their work deemed to not require RIPA authorisation, even in cases where the explanation provided appears to indicate surveillance was undertaken. The law in the UK, particularly the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, is broadly drawn to allow evidence to be introduced in court that in other jurisdictions would not be deemed admissible. Contrasted with the fruit of the poisonous tree provisions in the US, and broader protection offered by the Fourth Amendment, UK law risks failing to join up the evidential admissibility process and the regulation of surveillance. Accordingly, we are seriously concerned there is a gap in UK law emerging around surveillance and the ability of third parties to conduct surveillance operations without proper regulation. As the cost of advanced surveillance technologies falls, the temptation is for a number of individuals and organisations to take advantage of the covert cameras, hidden recording devices, aerial devices and countless other gadgets that are now available in a growing market. While there are many situations where regulation is not appropriate, it is also essential to maintain legal safeguards to deter the unaccountable and improper use of such technologies. Equally, as is the risk with private investigators, the arrangement may allow techniques to be used that would require RIPA authorisation, but because they are conducted by a third party, the commissioning organisation can claim it was unaware of the specific methods employed. Whether private investigators, individual citizens or unconnected third party organisations, we believe that the law should be revised to ensure that if surveillance is undertaken and the intention is to use the material obtained in legal proceedings, if it has not been undertaken by the police then it should not be admissible if it has not been authorised under RIPA. Equally, the ongoing lack of custodial sentences for those guilty of an offence under section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998 remains a serious issue and particularly where private investigators may be gathering information that they are not authorised to do so. With as many as 10,000 people working as private investigators in the UK, we agree with the Home Affairs Select Committee that the current legal framework is wholly inadequate. This highlights the ongoing concern that RIPA is not fit for purpose, in failing to deal with evidence and material obtained outside the legislative framework. Equally, the changing nature of surveillance - particularly the ability to search online, through social networks and through semi-public sources of information - further reinforces the need for the law to be reformed to strengthen protection against unwarranted and unauthorised surveillance becoming a frequent occurrence. Details: London: Big Brother Watch, 2013. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2016 at: https://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Private-Investigators-Final-Report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Private-Investigators-Final-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 145627 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsPrivate InvestigationsSurveillance |
Author: Murphy, Sandra Tibbetts Title: Police Body Cameras in Domestic and Sexual Assault Investigations: Considerations and Unanswered Questions Summary: Over the last several years, as the public demand for law enforcement's use of body cameras has increased dramatically, much has been written about body cameras as a law enforcement tool, including constitutional analyses, recommended protocols and procedures and even assessments of differing body camera models. Communities in the United Kingdom and United States have initiated pilot programs to determine the appropriate and most effective use of body cameras by policing agencies. Research regarding how body cameras are used, in what situations and their effect, if any, on law enforcement response and citizen behavior, however, remains very limited. "There remains insufficient empirical research to fully support or refute many of the claims made about the police body-worn cameras." If research on body camera programs in general is limited, the use of body cameras when responding to and investigating cases of domestic violence and sexual assault is almost nonexistent. In the few articles and studies that even mention body cameras in the context of law enforcement response to domestic violence and sexual assault, such references carry the connotation of being afterthoughts, tagged on to a larger argument or recommendation as a means of further support. This paper identifies and addresses the various issues – those known and unresolved – that may arise when law enforcement equipped with body cameras respond to victims of domestic violence and sexual assault, including issues of privacy and confidentiality, witness intimidation, possible evidentiary challenges when using body camera footage in trial, and unintended consequences such access and use may create for victims. Details: Minneapolis, MN: The Battered Women’s Justice Project, 2015. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2017: http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/police-body-cams-in-domestic-and-sexual-assault-inve.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/police-body-cams-in-domestic-and-sexual-assault-inve.pdf Shelf Number: 146018 Keywords: Body-Worn CamerasCriminal InvestigationsDomestic ViolencePolice AccountabilityPolice Body Worn CamerasSexual Assaults |
Author: Feeney, Matthew Title: Surveillance Takes Wing: Privacy in the Age of Police Drones Summary: Unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as "drones," are being used in a range of industries, including conservation, journalism, archeaology, and policing. (In this paper I will use the word "drone" to apply to unmanned aerial vehicles, excluding unmanned aquatic vehicles and terrestrial robots.) Law enforcement drones have clear benefits: allowing police to more easily find missing persons, suspects, and accident victims, for example. They also allow police to investigate dangerous situations such as bomb threats and toxic spills. Yet without strict controls on their use, drones could present a very serious threat to citizens' privacy. Regrettably, while the Supreme Court has tackled privacy issues amid the emergence of new technologies, the Court's rulings on aerial surveillance are not well suited for today, now that police are using drones. Fortunately, lawmakers at the state and federal levels can implement policies that allow police to take advantage of drones while protecting privacy. These policies should not only address familiar issues associated with searches, such as warrant requirements, but also relatively new concerns involving weaponization, biometric software, and surveillance technology. Such controls and regulations will allow police to do their job and prevent drones from being used as tools for secretive and needlessly intrusive surveillance Details: Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Analysis No. 807: Accessed February 7, 2017 at: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa807_1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa807_1.pdf Shelf Number: 146014 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsDronesPolice SurveillancePolice TechnologyPrivacy |
Author: Kim, KiDeuk Title: 2016 Law Enforcement Use of Social Media Survey Summary: A national scan of practice among law enforcement agencies across the United States reveals that they use social media to notify the public of safety concerns, manage public relations, and gather evidence for criminal investigations. The Urban Institute and the International Association of Chiefs of Police partnered to develop a comprehensive understanding of law enforcement's use of social media. A total of 539 agencies representing 48 states participated in the survey and answered questions regarding their use of social media, the management of social media engagement activities, barriers to success, and their future social media needs. Details: Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2017. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88661/2016-law-enforcement-use-of-social-media-survey.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88661/2016-law-enforcement-use-of-social-media-survey.pdf Shelf Number: 145584 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsInformation TechnologyPolice TechnologySocial Media |
Author: Children's Commissioner for England Title: Investigating Child Sexual Abuse: The Length of Criminal Investigations Summary: Increased reports of sexual offences are placing a significant demand on police, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), local authority children's services departments, the criminal and family courts, and specialist voluntary sector services for victims and survivors. Investigations by Police and children's services into child sexual abuse are life-changing for victims. Where capacity is stretched to meet the increasing demand on resources for investigations, there is a risk that cases will take even longer to resolve, exacerbating the trauma experienced by children and their families. Given this concern, the Children's Commissioner's Office has examined the length of criminal justice processes in child sexual abuse (CSA) cases. The Commissioner has used Home Office data from 18 police forces and national data from the CPS to investigate the timescales involved in CSA cases in England between 2012/13 and 2015/161, from the point of initial report to finalisation in court. This report finds that The investigative process for CSA cases is considerably longer than adult sexual offences. In 2015/16, the median length of time for investigations of CSA cases was 248 days. In comparison, the median length for the investigations of adult sexual offences was 147 days, which is 101 days less than the average for CSA offences. Child sexual abuse investigations take longer than all other crime types according to the data available. For example, the median length of time taken from crime recording to a charge outcome in 15/16 in relation to drug offences (90 days), theft (73 days) and violence against a person (72 days) is considerably shorter than CSA offences (248 days). Although this may reflect the relative complexity of these investigations, it is clear that victims of CSA face a considerable wait to until the perpetrator is charged. This is likely to be a period of huge uncertainty for victims of sexual abuse - the police and CPS should explore ways of working more effectively to minimise delays and increase the speed of decision-making. These findings strongly support the rapid implementation of three measures for improving the quality and speed of decision-making in criminal investigations of CSA - (i) a licence to practice for professionals working on CSA cases to improve decision-making in CSA investigations; (ii) embedding CPS Rape and Serious Sexual Offence (RASSO) specialists in police child abuse investigation teams to improve collaboration between the CPS and police officers; and (iii) the establishment and roll-out of 'children's houses', child-friendly facilities where victims of CSA participate in police interviews, and also receive therapeutic support. Details: London: The Commissioner, 2017. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2017 at: https://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Investigating%20Child%20Sexual%20Abuse%20CCO%20April%202017%201.2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Investigating%20Child%20Sexual%20Abuse%20CCO%20April%202017%201.2.pdf Shelf Number: 145918 Keywords: Child Sexual AbuseChild Sexual ExploitationCriminal InvestigationsSex Offenders |
Author: Patrick, Rodger Title: A Tangled Web: Why you can't believe crime statistics Summary: Crime is going down - officially. The trouble is that most people don't believe it: they feel that society is becoming more crime-ridden. So what could explain the discrepancy between the claims made by politicians and the everyday experience of citizens? In this hard-hitting expose, Rodger Patrick, former Chief Inspector of West Midlands Police, shows how this has come about. He unpacks the gaming behaviours of police forces under pressure from central government to reduce crime rates and increase detection rates by any means - including some that are unethical and even criminal. A Tangled Web takes the reader into the arcane world of 'cuffing' - making crimes disappear by refusing to believe the victims; 'nodding' - inducing suspects to 'nod' at locations where they can claim to have committed crimes that will be 'taken into consideration', sometimes in return for sex, drugs and alcohol; 'stitching', or fabricating evidence, which allows police forces to obtain convictions without ever going to court; and 'skewing', or concentrating resources on offences that are used as performance indicators, at the expense of time-consuming investigations into more serious crime. Rodger Patrick cites the now considerable number of official inquiries into police forces that have uncovered evidence of these practices on such a scale, and over such a wide area, that they cannot be put down to a few 'rotten apples'. He argues that the problems are organisational, and result from making the career prospects of police officers dependent on performance management techniques originally devised for the commercial sector. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary has long taken a relaxed view of the problem, putting a generous interpretation on evidence uncovered in its investigations, although in a small number of cases officers have had to resign or even face criminal charges. Details: London: Civitas, 2014. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 31, 2017 at: http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/ATangledWeb.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/ATangledWeb.pdf Shelf Number: 146619 Keywords: Crime StatisticsCriminal InvestigationsPolice BehaviorPolice Statistics |
Author: Higginson, Angela Title: Investigating serious violent crime: what works, what doesn't and for what crime types? Summary: Serious violent crime is a persistent and significant criminal justice issue (see Eisner, 2003; Fuller, 2013; Truman, Langton, & Planty, 2013; Wallace et al., 2009). In 2003 and 2008, the Australian Institute of Criminology delivered a clear message: despite the relatively low number of incidents compared to non-violent crime, serious violent crime offences account for a substantial portion of the costs of crime in Australia (Mayhew, 2003; Rollings, 2008). Moreover, a number of scholars have demonstrated a decline in police clearance of serious violent crime over recent decades (Horvath et al., 2001; Litwin & Xu, 2007; Riedel, 2008). Although investigation and responding to serious violent crime are core components of police work, the evidence-base for police investigative techniques for serious violent crime lacks the level of evaluation and synthesis seen for other policing interventions which have been predominantly assessed according to their impact on general crime and disorder. This systematic review aims to redress this imbalance by conducting the first ever systematic review focusing on the effectiveness of techniques that police use to investigate serious violent crime. Our review examines the evidence on police investigative techniques for serious violent crime to determine what works, what doesn't, and for what crime types. Specifically, we systematically evaluate the impact of police investigative techniques on key police outcomes in the context of serious violent crime: offender identification, arrests, elicitation of confessions, convictions and case closure. Details: Sydney: Criminal Research Advisory Council, 2017. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2017 at: http://crg.aic.gov.au/reports/1718/43-1314-FinalReport.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://crg.aic.gov.au/reports/1718/43-1314-FinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 147966 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsPolice InvestigationsViolent Crime |
Author: Electronic Frontier Foundation Title: Patterns of Misconduct: FBI Intelligence Violations from 2001 - 2008 Summary: In a review of nearly 2,500 pages of documents released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a result of litigation under the Freedom of Information Act, EFF uncovered alarming trends in the Bureau's intelligence investigation practices. The documents consist of reports made by the FBI to the Intelligence Oversight Board of violations committed during intelligence investigations from 2001 to 2008. The documents suggest that FBI intelligence investigations have compromised the civil liberties of American citizens far more frequently, and to a greater extent, than was previously assumed. In particular, EFF's analysis provides new insight into: Number of Violations Committed by the FBI From 2001 to 2008, the FBI reported to the IOB approximately 800 violations of laws, Executive Orders, or other regulations governing intelligence investigations, although this number likely significantly under-represents the number of violations that actually occurred. From 2001 to 2008, the FBI investigated, at minimum, 7000 potential violations of laws, Executive Orders, or other regulations governing intelligence investigations. Based on the proportion of violations reported to the IOB and the FBI's own statements regarding the number of NSL violations that occurred, the actual number of violations that may have occurred from 2001 to 2008 could approach tens of thousands of possible violations of law, Executive Order, or other regulations governing intelligence investigations. Substantial Delays in the Intelligence Oversight Process From 2001 to 2008, both FBI and IOB oversight of intelligence activities was delayed and likely ineffectual; on average, 2.5 years elapsed between a violation's occurrence and its eventual reporting to the IOB. Type and Frequency of FBI Intelligence Violations From 2001 to 2008, of the nearly 800 violations reported to the IOB: over one-third involved FBI violation of rules governing internal oversight of intelligence investigations. nearly one-third involved FBI abuse, misuse, or careless use of the Bureau's National Security Letter authority. almost one-fifth involved an FBI violation of the Constitution, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or other laws governing criminal investigations or intelligence gathering activities. From 2001 to 2008, in nearly half of all NSL violations, third-parties to whom NSLs were issued - phone companies, internet service providers, financial institutions, and credit agencies -contributed in some way to the FBI's unauthorized receipt of personal information. From 2001 to 2008, the FBI engaged in a number of flagrant legal violations, including: submitting false or inaccurate declarations to courts. using improper evidence to obtain federal grand jury subpoenas. accessing password protected documents without a warrant. Details: San Francisco: EFF, 2011. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 20, 2018 at: https://www.eff.org/wp/patterns-misconduct-fbi-intelligence-violations Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.eff.org/wp/patterns-misconduct-fbi-intelligence-violations Shelf Number: 149176 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsFBIFederal Bureau of InvestigationsSurveillance |
Author: Police Executive Research Forum Title: New National Commitment Required:: The Changing Nature of Crime And Criminal Investigations Summary: To say that computers, communication systems, and other technologies are changing the policing profession is a vast understatement. In recent years, much of PERF's research and policy development work has focused on the impact of new technologies on crime analysis and police use of force. We have also studied new devices such as body-worn cameras and, most recently, the revolution that is occurring in 911 and emergency communications. For this report, we stepped back and assessed the impact of computers and other technologies on the nature of crime itself, and on how technology is changing investigations. As part of our Critical Issues in Policing series, PERF assembled nearly 200 experts in criminal investigations, technology, and police operations and management to explore these issues during a day-long conference in Washington, D.C. We learned about new types of computer-related crimes, and also about criminals' use of technology to commit many old types of crime. For law enforcement agencies to keep up in this new environment, their approaches to criminal investigations must change. Relying on physical evidence and witness statements is no longer sufficient in many cases. Investigators need to know how to access and secure data from mobile devices, social media, Fitbits and other devices that store computerized data, and the so-called "dark web." The reality is that the science of criminal investigations is changing rapidly, and many law enforcement agencies are not prepared for the changes that are taking place. This report is a wake-up call for the policing profession. If we are to be successful in combating crime in the 21st century, agencies must have the training, tools, and skilled personnel to understand the changing nature of crime and to be resourceful in investigating new types of crime. Details: Washington, DC; PERF, 2018. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Critical Issues in Policing Series: Accessed April 12, 2018 at: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/ChangingNatureofCrime.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/ChangingNatureofCrime.pdf Shelf Number: 149791 Keywords: Crime AnalysisCriminal InvestigationsPolice Technology |
Author: Big Brother Watch Title: Smile you're on body worn camera. Part II - Police. The use of body worn cameras by UK police forces Summary: Smile you're on Body Worn Camera Part II - Police reveals for the first time the investment police in the UK have made in equipping frontline officers with body worn cameras. Since 2010 the police, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and politicians have enthusiastically promoted the roll out of body worn cameras. The public have been told the technology is a critical tool in reducing violence against officers, improving transparency in police/public relations, assisting the police with the number of guilty pleas they obtain and will play an essential role in speeding up justice by being used as evidence in court. Off the back of such enthusiasm we felt it necessary to investigate how many police forces had invested in the technology, how many cameras were being used by frontline staff and if the benefits lived up to the promises promulgated by the various groups. Responses to our Freedom of Information request reveals that 71% have adopted the technology, with a total spend of $22,703,235 on 47,922 body worn cameras. This is a huge increase from 2010 when the police told us in response to a Freedom of Information request that they had spent $2.2million on 2,843 cameras. 1 With such an increase in investment it would be logical to assume that the police had determined conclusively that the technology was indispensable and worthy of such substantial spending, and that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) could show the extent to which footage from body worn cameras has benefitted conviction rates. However, this is not the case. Neither the police nor CPS could provide us with data relating to the use of footage in criminal proceedings. This makes it impossible to verify the promise of improved convictions based on the use of the technology. Furthermore, publicly available findings from the police regarding the outcome of the trials of the technology reveal inconclusive proof of the benefits to frontline policing and the public, and ongoing concerns with the technology itself. Meanwhile, academic research shows that the way the cameras are deployed can impact the safety and security of the police and public alike. If the plan for future policing is to provide every frontline officer with a body worn camera, proof of purpose is vital. Our findings reveal that such proof is far from conclusive. In light of our findings we make three policy recommendations: 1. Data must be collated and published to show how often body worn camera footage is used as evidence during court proceedings and in obtaining early guilty pleas. 2. Forces must publish regular transparency reports to show how body worn cameras are being used in day to day policing. 3. Forces should ensure that all body worn cameras deployed feature a visual aid and screen showing clearly when the citizen when they are being filmed. Protection of data when at rest or in transit must be standard. Key Findings Based on responses from 45 police forces2 - 47,922 body worn cameras have been purchased by UK police forces. - 32 Forces (71%) use body worn cameras. - 4 Forces (9%) were in the process of beginning trials or were planning on rolling out body worn cameras for the first time. - 6 forces (12%) do not use body worn cameras and do not have any trials or roll outs planned. - In total $22,703,235 has been spent on body worn cameras. - Neither the CPS nor the police told us how often footage has been used in court proceedings. - 19 forces use body worn cameras made by Reveal. - Axon (formerly trading as Taser International), supply 26,935 cameras to forces, including the three largest police forces in England the Metropolitan Police, Greater Manchester Police and West Midlands Police. - 3 forces provided us with information relating to trials of body worn cameras which had been undertaken. Details: London: Big Brother Watch, 2017. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2018 at: https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Smile-Youre-on-Body-Worn-Camera-Part-II-Police.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Smile-Youre-on-Body-Worn-Camera-Part-II-Police.pdf Shelf Number: 149980 Keywords: Body-Worn CamerasCriminal InvestigationsPolice AccountabilityPolice InvestigationPolice SurveillancePolice Technology |
Author: Human Rights Center, UC Berkeley School of Law. Title: Building Trust: Perspectives on a Victim-Centered Approach to Human Trafficking Investigations in Los Angeles County Summary: THIS REPORT PROVIDES THE FINDINGS of a study of the Human Trafficking Bureau (Bureau) of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, which is a member of the Los Angeles Regional Human Trafficking Task Force (Task Force). The primary objective of the study was to document the strengths and challenges the Bureau and other members of the Task Force encountered as they apply a victim-centered approach to investigations of human trafficking cases in their first year of operations (November 2015 to December 2016). Such an approach prioritizes the needs of victims and works to minimize re-traumatization. Established in September 2015 through a grant from the U.S. Department of Justice, the Task Force is a multi-agency partnership between federal, state, and local law enforcement and social service agencies mandated to "prosecute traffickers and buyers who target them, and provide services designed to restore the victims to lives free from the trauma bonds they've been forced to endure." The Bureau, which had been established earlier by Los Angeles Country Sheriff Jim McDonnell, was assigned to lead the Task Force in combatting human trafficking-defined as the recruiting, smuggling, transporting, harboring, buying, or selling a person for exploitation-in the county. From the onset, the Bureau and the Task Force embraced a novel approach to human trafficking investigations by physically co-locating investigators, prosecutors, and representatives of service provider organizations in the Bureau's headquarters in Monterey Park. Using an open-floor plan, the Bureau houses representatives from the Task Force, including the Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking (CAST); the FBI; District Attorney's Office; Los Angeles County Probation Department; Department of Children and Family Services; and Department of Homeland Security. The Bureau maintains an investigative unit called the Detective Information Research Center (DIRC), which provides backup research for investigators. The Bureau also maintains a separate unit called the Sexual Assault Felony Enforcement Team (SAFE), which conducts cyber investigations of crimes against children (ICAC), including child pornography, sextortion, enticement, and crimes committed by California State sex registrants. The Bureau's human trafficking teams have access to a "soft room" for interviewing and offering services to trafficking victims. While the Task Force is mandated to investigate both labor and sex trafficking cases, the vast majority of cases during the first year of its operations have involved sex trafficking. The Bureau has a three-pronged approach to sex trafficking. The first is to identify and locate victims. Once victims are located, service providers are brought in to provide a range of services from medical care to housing. The second prong is to arrest traffickers and gather evidence for prosecutions. And the third is to staunch demand in the sex trade by targeting buyers, or "johns." Using semi-structured questionnaires, researchers at the Human Rights Center, in partnership with Berkeley Law's International Human Rights Law Clinic, interviewed 45 key informants, including investigators, researchers, service providers, and prosecutors directly located in the Bureau or connected to it. Researchers also reviewed seven case files representative of various sex trafficking cases the Bureau had investigated during the first six months of 2016 and observed two sting operations directed at buyers and traffickers in Los Angeles County. All key informant interviews were transcribed and coded. In all, more than 35 codes were developed and tagged, resulting in 412 pages of coded data. The codes included a range of topics, including reluctance of victims to cooperate with law enforcement, shelter and long-term housing, challenges of investigating labor trafficking, the hidden nature of the crime, relations between investigators and prosecutors, proving the elements of the crime of human trafficking, criminalization vs. decriminalization of prostitution, and inter-agency co-location and cooperation. Since the Bureau has investigated only a few cases of labor trafficking, the report's primary focus is on sex trafficking cases. Details: Berkeley, CA: The Center, 2017. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 14, 2018 at: https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/LA_report_2017_Nov20release.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/LA_report_2017_Nov20release.pdf Shelf Number: 150178 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingLabor TraffickingSex TraffickingSexual ExploitationVictims of Trafficking |
Author: Morgan, Anthony Title: Impact of ballistic evidence on criminal investigations Summary: The challenges associated with investigating serious crime, particularly organised crime, are well known. Increasingly, police are turning to new information technologies to support traditional investigative techniques. Automated ballistic information technology allows police to link cases that would otherwise not be known to be related. By linking investigations, police can identify new leads and suspects. The current study used interviews with investigators in two states to understand what impact ballistic evidence has on criminal investigations into firearm crime. The results revealed a significant number of cases benefited from linked investigations- including cold cases and cases involving organized crime groups. This research helps to demonstrate the potential value of technology to law enforcement, and the circumstances in which it is most effective. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2018. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 548: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: https://aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi548 Year: 2018 Country: Australia URL: https://aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi548 Shelf Number: 150330 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsFirearmsForensic EvidenceGun ViolenceGuns-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized Crime |
Author: Vovak, Heather Title: Examining the Relationship between Crime Rates and Clearance Rates Using Dual Trajectory Analysis Summary: Police agencies dedicate large amounts of resources, and place a great deal of importance, on criminal investigations and solving crimes. However, very stable clearance rates over time in the U.S., coupled with highly fluctuating crime rates begs the question of whether there is actually a relationship between these efforts and crime rates. Specifically, if police improve their ability to solve crimes, does this have any effect on crime rates over time? A deterrence relationship might indicate that an increase in clearance rates leads to a decrease in crime rates. However, while some prior research indicates evidence of a deterrent effect when examining the relationship between crime rates and clearance rates, other research using various methods has found that crime and clearance rates move in the same direction, or have found no clear relationship between crime and clearance rates. Details: Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2016. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed may 24, 2018 at: http://digilib.gmu.edu/handle/1920/10536 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://digilib.gmu.edu/handle/1920/10536 Shelf Number: 150357 Keywords: Clearance Rates Crimes Rates Criminal InvestigationsCriminal Statistics |
Author: Police Executive Research Forum Title: Cost and Benefits Of Body-Worn Camera Deployments Summary: Many new technologies are changing the business of policing in America. Cybercrime and computer-assisted crime are changing the very nature of crime and criminal investigations. Police are starting to deploy new technologies for receiving video and other digital information through 911 systems, and are learning how to manage and use all that incoming data. Meanwhile, FirstNet is bringing a new level of sophistication to how police can transmit digital data to officers in the field. Computer-assisted crime analysis is helping identify crime patterns so police can prevent the next crime from happening. Social media platforms like Twitter are changing how police share information, and how they obtain critically important information. In the midst of all of these technologies, some of which are quite complex and technical, we have an important new technology that anyone can understand: body-worn cameras (BWCs). These simple video cameras are little more than a rugged version of the camera in your smartphone. And yet these devices have the potential to transform policing for the better, by creating video records of the incidents that officers encounter, and how they respond to those incidents. While the technology of BWCs is easy to understand they're simply video cameras - the deployment of BWCs raises a number of important questions that must be addressed, such as the extent to which BWCs change or "civilize" the behavior of police officers and members of the public, and whether or not any changes lead to reduced police use-of-force and fewer complaints against police officers. Another important question is whether BWCs can help police agencies build better relationships with the communities they serve by promoting organizational transparency and accountability. While the potential of BWCs to improve policing for the better is appealing to many law enforcement executives, an important concern are the financial costs of sustaining a BWC program. Beyond the up-front costs of purchasing cameras are significant back-end costs, especially those associated with maintaining, storing, and sharing the large amount of video data that BWCs produce. It is important that police leaders have a clear understanding of how these costs compare to the anticipated benefits of deploying BWCs. The PERF research described in this report was designed to answer some of these questions about BWCs. With generous support from the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, we conducted one of the largest and most comprehensive surveys to date of law enforcement agencies regarding their deployments of body-worn cameras. This survey, which obtained data from a representative sample of police agencies nationwide, revealed a number of important findings: - Our survey found that more than one-third of American law enforcement agencies have already deployed BWCs to some or all of their officers, and another 50% currently have plans to do so. - We found that a large majority of departments with BWCs are happy with them. More than 85% of them would recommend them to other police agencies. - There is variation in how widely agencies have deploy BWCs within the department. More than 40 percent of agencies reported that they have given BWCs to all sworn officers, but some agencies have made only partial deployments. For example, three agencies that PERF studied more closely had only equipped a fraction of their police force with BWCs: 10 percent of officers in Phoenix; 30 percent of officers in Dallas; and 44 percent in Mesa, AZ. - We found that for most agencies, the cost of BWCs are quite low - approximately $5,000 a year or less. (However, the costs are low because most police departments either have a small number of officers, or they are only partially deploying BWCs to some, not all, of their officers. BWC costs run into millions of dollars in large agencies.) - Importantly, we found that the most important reason given for adopting BWCs, by over nine in 10 agencies, was to promote accountability, transparency, and legitimacy. This objective, which demonstrates a strong desire among agencies to build trust and foster relationships with their communities, is laudable. To determine if they are meeting this goal, and to ensure that their practices are consistent with the expectations and values of the community, we recommend that agencies conduct regular surveys with their community to measure satisfaction with police services in their neighborhoods. Finally, we tried to assess whether BWCs might reduce the number of civil lawsuits against police departments. In theory, the presence of cameras may cause officers and community members or suspects to behave better, and in some cases, people have been known to threaten lawsuits but change their mind when they find out there is video of the incident. BWC footage in some cases can quickly resolve what would otherwise be a "he said, she said" disagreement. However, we were unable to obtain enough data to make strong conclusions about whether BWCs reduce lawsuits. With few exceptions, most cities simply do not record information about the number of lawsuits filed against them, the nature of the complaints, the outcomes, and related data. We were able to obtain lawsuit data from three cities - Dallas, Phoenix, and Mesa, AZ - and we made some limited findings based on that information. Details: Washington, DC: PERF, 2018. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2018 at: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/BWCCostBenefit.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/BWCCostBenefit.pdf Shelf Number: 150592 Keywords: Body-Worn Cameras Camera Technology Cameras Cost-Benefit Analysis Criminal InvestigationsLaw Enforcement Technology Police Accountability Police Surveillance Police Use of Force Police-Citizen Interactions Police-Community Relations |
Author: Jannetta, Jesse Title: Oakland Stakeholder Perspectives of Homicide and Shooting Scene Response Summary: This report explores how stakeholders involved in homicide and shooting scenes in Oakland, California perceive their interactions with law enforcement and community partners. This study draws on interviews with shooting survivors, family members of homicide victims, Oakland Police Department officers, and community service providers and partner staff. It found that survivors and family members desired interactions with law enforcement officers and community partners that aligned with procedural justice principles, but they did not always perceive that they received it. Details: Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2019. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2019 at: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99612/oakland_stakeholder_perspectives_of_homicide_and_shooting_scene_response_3.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99612/oakland_stakeholder_perspectives_of_homicide_and_shooting_scene_response_3.pdf Shelf Number: 154503 Keywords: Crime ScenesCriminal InvestigationsGun ViolenceHomicidesPolice-Citizen InteractionsProcedural Justice |
Author: Jannetta, Jesse Title: Procedural Justice in Homicide and Shooting Scene Response: Executive Summary Summary: This document summarizes findings from the literature review, practice review, and interviews conducted in Oakland by the Urban Institute (Urban) and the Urban Peace Institute (UPI) under the "Oakland Procedural Justice Principles for Police Officers" cooperative agreement with the City of Oakland. The work under this cooperative agreement is intended to inform Oakland's efforts to improve policies and practices related to the police department's management, response, and activities at shooting and homicide scenes, and to develop and implement procedural justice and related trainings for proactive and investigative police units. This document draws upon and synthesizes findings presented in more detail in documents devoted to the literature, practice review, and interviews conducted by our team. It presents findings on common issues, promising practices, and possible operational approaches to improving responses to shooting and homicide scenes in Oakland, organized by the four components of procedural justice. It then presents guiding principles for efforts to improve responses to homicide and shooting scenes using a procedural justice framework. Police play a critical role in reducing community violence, but their legitimacy can be undermined by a lack of community trust, particularly in high crime communities where intervention is needed most. Mistrust of law enforcement is especially acute among young men of color, especially those living in neighborhoods afflicted by crime and disorder associated with gang activity (Kennedy 2009; Liberman and Fontaine 2015). The absence of trust reduces the public's willingness to report crime, engage with law enforcement on crime control efforts, and abide by the law, since trust is a fundamental component of police legitimacy (Bradford et al. 2014; Tyler and Jackson 2014; Resig and Lloyd 2009; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). Because the investigative process relies heavily on key witnesses from the community, it is important that detectives engage in practices that are geared at maintaining legitimacy and cultivating trust. Procedural justice provides an operational framework for building police legitimacy and repairing relationships in communities affected by gun violence. Findings from a broad array of studies find a statistically significant relationship between procedural justice and police legitimacy, and that procedural justice carries greater weight than other variables (Hinds and Murphy 2007; Murphy 2005; Tyler 2003; Tyler and Fagan 2008). There is less evidence that shows that officers can deliberately create more legitimacy by being procedurally just. Details: Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2019. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2019 at: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99611/procedural_justice_in_homicide_and_shooting_scene_response_executive_summary_0.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99611/procedural_justice_in_homicide_and_shooting_scene_response_executive_summary_0.pdf Shelf Number: 154505 Keywords: Crime ScenesCriminal InvestigationsGun ViolenceHomicidesPolice ResponsePolice-Citizen InteractionsProcedural Justice |
Author: Jones, Chris Title: The EU Data Retention Directive: a case study in the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism policy Summary: SECILE is an EU-funded research project examining the legitimacy and effectiveness of European Union counter-terrorism measures (CTMs). This report examines the implementation of Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks (the "Data Retention Directive"). The Directive obliges providers of internet and telephony services to keep detailed "traffic data" (or "metadata") regarding the identities and activities of their subscribers for between 6 and 24 months and provide access to police and security agencies for the purposes of investigating serious crime, and has been described as the "the most privacy-invasive instrument ever adopted by the EU". This report explains the policy-making process that resulted in the Directive, the obligations stemming from it, and the way these have been transposed into the national law of the member states with reference to infringement proceedings, legal challenges and the review of the legislation by the European Commission. Details: SICILE Consortium, 2013. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: SECILE Deliverable 2.4. www.secile.eu : Accessed march 27, 2019 at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-data-retention-directive-in-europe-a-case-study.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-data-retention-directive-in-europe-a-case-study.pdf Shelf Number: 155181 Keywords: CommunicationsCounter-TerrorismCriminal InvestigationsData RetentionTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Dowling, Christopher Title: How do police use CCTV footage in criminal investigations? Summary: This study examines how police use CCTV footage in criminal investigations. Structured interviews were conducted with 146 sworn members of the NSW Police Force who had recently requested footage from the NSW rail system's network of CCTV cameras. Footage is highly valued by investigators. Nine in 10 investigators reported using the footage when it was available, and two-thirds were able to use it for the reason they had requested it. One in three investigators encountered issues related to image quality or coverage; however, two-thirds of investigators were provided with footage of a suspect and one-third with footage of the incident under investigation. Consistent with prior research, the use and usefulness varied between offence types, with the most positive results observed for assault offences. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2019. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice No. 57: Accessed April 12, 2019 at: https://aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi575 Year: 2019 Country: Australia URL: https://aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi575 Shelf Number: 155383 Keywords: Cameras CCTV Closed-Circuit Television Criminal InvestigationsPolice Investigations Video Surveillance |
Author: Jorna, Penny Title: Commonwealth fraud investigations 2016-17 Summary: Fraud against the Commonwealth is a serious matter for all Australian Commonwealth entities and the Australian public. It prevents taxpayer dollars from reaching intended targets and affects the government's ability to deliver key services. In accordance with the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) and s 10 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014, all non-corporate Commonwealth entities are required to provide the AIC with information concerning their experience of fraud during the preceding year and the fraud control measures that they employ. This report presents information gathered in respect of the 2016-17 financial year. The Australian government is committed to tackling fraud against the Commonwealth by supporting research into the extent of the problem and promoting the development and use of fraud control practices to reduce risks and to detect and deal with fraud in a timely and effective manner. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2019. 88p., app. Source: Internet Resource: Statistical Report 15: Accessed July 16, 2019 at: https://aic.gov.au/publications/sr/sr15 Year: 2019 Country: Australia URL: https://aic.gov.au/publications/sr/sr15 Shelf Number: 156862 Keywords: Crime Statistics Criminal InvestigationsDishonesty Financial Crimes Fraud and Corruption |